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Near East & South Asia

PAKISTAN

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19 August 1992

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Regional Affairs

Expanding Relationship With Central Asia Foreseen

Islamic Movements Growing

92AS1304A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 2 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Nafis Siddiqui, "Islamic Movements in Central Asia"]

[Text] Religious movements are growing as strongly in the newly liberated countries of Central Asia as they are in other Muslim countries. Central Asian countries have a higher literacy rate and are more advanced economically than most other Muslim countries; Islamic movements, however, have been spreading in prosperous as well as backward societies.

Iran had accumulated a great amount of wealth from its oil and its ruling class was extreme in its devotion to Western ideas; but a reaction against this brought success to a religious movement, which can be called fundamentalist to a certain extent. The Iranian revolution intensified religious movements of which the effects began to be felt on the subcontinent as well as the countries to the west [sic]. Algeria stands on the threshold of an Islamic revolution; the war in Afghanistan was fought on the basis of religion and succeeded magnificently; the freedom movement in occupied Kashmir is also being fought with religious fervor. Central Asian countries cannot remain immune to the effects of the religious movements taking place all over the world. In Central Asia, religious movements are showing their effects in various ways; in these states, about 1,200 religious leaders are guiding 45 million Muslims. After remaining for such a long period under a nonreligious system, the fact that religious leadership has emerged in such large numbers shows that religion has deep roots in these cultures. With the emergence of Islamic movements, the issue has arisen as to which model should be followed in Central Asia. Some religious scholars would like to follow the example of Iran and take the framework of state directly under their control. Another group of religious leaders wants an Islamic system in tune with local needs; those who support modern ideas would like to adopt a Turkish-style system of government under which the state and religion have different roles. Foreign influence also plays a part in the matter; the Government of Iran is helping with all its diplomatic and financial resources those who favor an Iranian religious model. Turkey, on the other hand, is emphasizing its historical relations based on language and nationality and encouraging supporters of secularism. Russia and the West sympathize with Turkey because they also do not want to see the spread of fundamentalism in Central Asia. A large number of Central Asian religious scholars is opposed to both kinds of foreign influence. Saudi Arabia has not as yet gained any special influence in Central Asia and so far, its activities have been confined to distributing copies of the Koran; hence, I have not

mentioned that country. Those religious scholars opposed to foreign influence hold the view that Central Asia has its own peculiar conditions; during the past 70 years, the Muslims of the area fought against state oppression and violence to protect their religion and beliefs; they do not now need to learn from the outside how to live as Muslims. Mufti Yousuf, who was prominent in the Central Asian Muslim congress, says, "We are tired of imitating others; the time has come for us to choose our own way." The people, however, are not accepting this viewpoint; for example, the Muslim leaders of the Farghana valley regard people who hold this view as communist remnants. This area is famous in Central Asia for its Islamic heritage and its many mosques; the people of this area support an Iranian-style extreme Islamic system for Uzbekistan. They held fast to their beliefs and resisted every kind of pressure under the communist regime and their women strictly observe the purdah [wearing the veil] system. Those who support the Central Asian-style of Islam have several accusations leveled against them; for example, Uzbekistan's Ahya-I-Islam party's accusation regarding Mufti Yousuf is that when Saudi Arabia gave the central religious board 1 million copies of the Koran for distribution among Central Asian Muslims, the money was used instead to construct new mosques, preserve old mosques and conduct religious activities [sic]. No one can predict the path that the Central Asian countries will choose in the future; but it seems certain that this society will not remain immune to the effects of Islamic movements. The majority of Muslims in these states belong to the Sunni sect; hence, the Iranian-style of extremism may not find favor here. But there seems little possibility either that Saudi Arabia will be able to spread its influence. The model that would be successfully adopted in Afghanistan is the most likely to find acceptance in Central Asia. But the situation in Afghanistan remains unclear and probably foreign conspiracies want to keep the situation unclear in order to allow liberal-minded individuals to spread their influence in these newly liberated countries. Many activities are afoot in this connection; for example, Uzbekistan's doors are opening to the West.

The newly started Uzbek Airways has initiated weekly flights between Tashkent and Istanbul.

Turkey set up its embassy in March. Uzbek Airways will start flights this year to Beijing, Zurich, Karachi, and Delhi. Uzbekistan's relations with South Korea give a glimpse of the future. Two hundred thousand Korean nationals live in Uzbekistan.

According to Uzbekistan's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 43 joint projects have been agreed upon with other countries; the largest number are with China, Turkey, India, and Germany. Pakistan is next on the list.

An Uzbekistan trading house has been established in Zurich and another is being set up in Singapore.

A Dutch company, which represents several European industrial countries as well as several major companies of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, is establishing an office in Tashkent.

The former Soviet Union was a leading producer of gold and one-third of its gold production came from Uzbekistan. The contract for gold mining has also been given to a Western company.

There is a similar dual trend in the other countries of Central Asia. On the one hand, the people want to use their newly found freedom to restore their Islamic identity and are being helped in this objective by other Islamic countries although these countries have their own political aims as well. On the other hand, the ruling authorities are establishing new economic relations in directions from which new ideas of liberalism and secularism will receive encouragement. It remains to be seen whether the attempt to nullify Islamic movements through economic relations will succeed or whether the Islamic movements will grow and gain the upper hand.

The danger is that if Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia should each try to further their own separate political objectives and spread their influence or if they should clash, the Islamic movements would be harmed and the newly established economic relationships would carry the Central Asian societies towards liberalism and secularism.

Contacts To Increase

92AS1304B Karachi JANG in Urdu 6 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Nisar Ahmad Cheema: "Contacts With Central Asian Republics and Our Responsibilities"]

[Text] The importance of Pakistan's relations with the Muslim states of Central Asia and the probable effect of these relations on the international level is well-known among intellectual circles. International analysts and scholars are now saying that if Pakistan establishes special relations with the Muslim Central Asian countries and if Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey also are included in this circle (the possibility of which is obvious), this bloc would emerge as a strong international force. Our enemies are now openly expressing the same fears. We know what U.S. senator Pressler said during his visit to India six months ago; he stated, "An alliance between Pakistan and the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union can prove dangerous for India. An alliance of Islamic countries armed with nuclear weapons will pose a danger to India and international stability. Such a confederation or group could consist of Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union." A similar statement by Senator Pressler was published in the WASHINGTON POST in which he said, "If Islam is allowed to spread in the countries of Central Asia [sic], a feeling of their ancient religious and cultural ties to Pakistan and the other Muslim countries of the area will grow among the people there. There are many points of dissension among these

countries but all these will end in the name of Islam and a new nuclear superpower will come into existence in the region."

Our enemies are aware of changing conditions and are making the necessary plans for the future; the Muslims, on the other hand, are generally insensitive and uninterested in their national and social interests and affairs. The responsibility for finding a remedy for this national insensitivity rests on the shoulders of those individuals who have been gifted by divine grace with wisdom and intelligence.

Last year a number of responsible and sympathetic Pakistanis started a program in London for establishing contacts with Central Asian Muslims. The aim of the program was to study the changing conditions in Central Asia, point out the various ways in which Pakistan could establish relations and cooperation with these Muslim states and determine and fulfill the responsibilities connected with this objective. I remember that in the early meetings held in London in regard to the program certain respected individuals took the stand that instead of discussing an alliance or block of Muslims from a particular region, the subject should be the unity of the entire Islamic world. Perhaps some intellectuals and scholars in Pakistan also favor this stand, which is a point of principle. It is thus important to clarify here that it is the heartfelt desire and the prayer of every Muslim that the entire Muslim world should unite; but keeping in mind this ideological and true objective, the fact remains that it is necessary for the Muslims of different regions to consider their special regional, geographical, historical as well as certain immediate needs and problems and plan accordingly. A similar situation arose in the past when the Muslims of the subcontinent realized that in addition to the general demands for the unity of the Islamic world, there was a particular and immediate necessity that the Muslims of the subcontinent, for the sake of their own safety, should unite on a single platform and demand a separate homeland for themselves. If at that time anyone had said that the Muslims of the subcontinent should not limit their thinking and plans to this area alone and, instead of demanding a separate homeland in the region, they should talk of the unity of the entire Islamic world; and if the Muslims of the subcontinent had agreed to this proposition; it is difficult to say what would have come of the dream for a united Islamic world, but one can say with certainty that Pakistan would have never come into existence and the Muslims of the subcontinent would have remained forever the slaves of the Hindus. Iqbal, a man of great foresight who was a staunch supporter of Islamic unity, must have had the same arguments in mind when he wrote these verses:

The Muslims should unite to protect the Hareem
[Kaaba]

From the Nile to Kashghar

Break the idols of [the false gods] of color and race and
become one with the nation [of Islam]

So that there is no differentiation left of Iranian, Turani or Afghani

Whether China, Arabia or India, all are our homelands
We are Muslims and as such the world is our home.

While he advocated such lasting ideologies, Iqbal envisaged as well a separate country for the Muslims of the subcontinent and the fact is that there is no dichotomy between the new ideology [of a separate homeland] and the sentiments expressed in the verses quoted above; both ideas are different links and stages of the same philosophy.

If the Muslims of any area should unite on the basis of Islam rather than that of language, race, or region, such a union would be positive and welcome and would be considered one more step towards Islamic world unity. At the same time, it would be impossible and even unnatural to ignore, even with a basic Islamic relationship, certain other historical, cultural, emotional, and natural ties. Islam does not negate the existence of such ties; if one studies the various degrees of rights and responsibilities determined under Islam with respect to relatives, neighbors, etc. one would see that this natural religion places great emphasis on natural ties.

In view of these facts, it is impossible to deny our special relations with the Muslims of the subcontinent even as we uphold the idea of a world brotherhood of Muslims. Our relations with the Muslims of Kashmir are closer than our relations with the Muslims of the world in general and we cannot deny this relationship, which is that of the body and the cardiac artery. The Muslims of the world are our brothers but our relationship with our brothers in East Pakistan is a special one of which the depth and intensity cannot be expressed in words. Muslims living in far off places such as the United States or Africa may not understand this special feeling just as we may fail to understand some of their cultural and emotional ties. Our special relations with the Muslims of Central Asia are the lost links in this chain. The mother country of most of the Muslims of the subcontinent who ruled it for a thousand years was the populous region of Central Asia. Our spiritual, cultural, and emotional ties to the homeland of Imam Bukhari [theologian and founder of one of the four Sunni sects] need no elaboration. These special ties may explain why Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara occupy such important places in our history, culture, and poetry. The roads stretching from the Khyber Pass to Central Asia are the guardians of our history and culture of the past centuries. For a long time these roads were closed by unnatural obstacles and buried under the dust of unnatural regimes; the sacrifices of the Afghan mujahidin have opened these lost roads and the blood of Afghan martyrs has washed away the accumulated dust. Those ancient routes and relationships have been washed bright again by the blood of the Afghan mujahidin and martyrs. No man in his right mind would deny Pakistan's basic, historical, and key role in bringing about these magnificent and astonishing changes. There is no doubt that in fighting for their own freedom, the Afghans fought for the integrity

of Pakistan as well. If the Afghans had not stood against the Russians like a wall of iron; if they had not reduced the Russians to ignominy in a protracted war in Afghanistan and broken their backs, there is no doubt that we would have been the next victims. On the other hand, undoubtedly it was Pakistan that made it possible for the Afghans to fight the war of freedom. If, God forbid, there had been no Pakistan and the subcontinent had been under Hindu rule, who would have given shelter to more than 3 million Afghan old men, women and children? Which country would have become the base camp for the Afghan mujahidin and made excellent arrangements for their training and weapons supply? Would any other country have continued to help the mujahidin even though its civilians were bombed for years and explosions rocked its streets? Pakistan remained steadfast in its purpose even though it faced a superpower. Would any other country have stood up to the most tyrannical power of its time for the sake of Afghanistan's freedom and put at risk its own safety and everything else? It would not be inappropriate to say that the success of the Afghan jihad and the resulting defeat and dissolution of the Soviet Union, which brought freedom to the Muslims of Central Asia have all been possible, with the Grace of God, because of Pakistan. The light of freedom that has spread via Afghanistan to Central Asia has a clear and deep relationship to the dates, 23 March 1940 and 14 August 1947.

With this background, this is how the 60 million Muslims of the six free states of Central Asia now stand; their land is very fertile and vast (it comprised 20 percent of the total area of the Soviet Union) and is endowed with rich natural resources; one of the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, even has nuclear weapons and installations on its territory. The Muslims there are undecided and concerned about their future. They long, consciously or unconsciously, to join the caravan of the Islamic nations from which they were separated in the past. Together with this natural wish, it is understandable that the eyes of the Central Asian Muslims should be on the Islamic world in general and on Pakistan in particular.

At this historical, rare, and important juncture, the government and people of Pakistan bear heavy responsibilities such as:

1. We should have recognized the Central Asian states as soon as they declared their independence and moved with speed to establish diplomatic relations. In fact, Pakistan should have been the first country to recognize these states; but our foreign ministry officials followed a wait-and-see policy for several months for which there was no justification. Where emotions are at stake even more than profit or loss, the delay of a day or even a moment can be difficult to bear. Even if judged by the standards of profit and loss, the delay of more than three months in recognizing them was unnecessary and against the dictates of foresight and diplomacy.

2. Immediately following the declaration of independence by the Central Asian states, the Government of

Pakistan should have summoned an Islamic leadership conference to discuss matters relating to Central Asian Muslims and their countries. The conference should have recognized the Central Asian states on behalf of all Muslim countries and expressed their total support for these countries. The conference should have studied the conditions and needs of the Central Asian Muslims and arranged to send any help needed as soon as possible. Practical measures to provide such help are needed even now.

3. Following the Ashkabad conference, the Pakistani prime minister's tour of Uzbekistan will promote mutual relations and open new avenues of cooperation. Most of the Central Asian states will have to change the basic framework of their economy. They lack infrastructure in certain important fields; they need financial aid and loans as well as technology and experts. They should not have to ask others for those needed things that we have or we can obtain; we should provide these for them.

4. It is important to exchange delegations at various levels so as to discern each other's needs, find possible ways of cooperation and take practical measures. In the selection of delegations, it is necessary to choose individuals acquainted with the art of making friends; this applies to the selection of diplomatic personnel as well. Another point to be kept in mind is to avoid including such individuals in delegations or as embassy personnel or supervisors who have mentally and in practice abandoned those Islamic principles that constitute basic and important bonds between us and the Central Asian Muslims. Failure to do so would create disappointment and an unpleasant impression about Pakistan that is the center of Central Asian hopes. We would be guilty of disappointing a people who, even under the worst conditions, managed to preserve to a certain extent their Muslim identity and in the eyes of the Almighty we would be judged guilty as well. In this sensitive stage of restoring relations, it is necessary to pay attention to the psychological aspect; emotional ties can be very strong but very delicate as well. As the poet Anis has said, handle the crystal wine goblets carefully as the slightest touch may hurt them.

Failed Conference Seen Symptomatic of Divisions in JKLF

92AS1243F Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
7 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Mir Abdul Aziz: "The Conference That Did Not Come Off"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The Jammu and Kashmir "Qaumi Conference" which had been convened by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front [JKLF] for the first three days of the current month (July) has been postponed by the Convener who has said that India has not issued passports and Pakistan has not issued visas to the invitees from Indian-held Kashmir. Although Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs had said in a statement from

Washington that his country would not have any objection to holding of the Conference, later developments and the statements of the Azad Kashmir Prime Minister, and of a "spokesman" of the Government of Pakistan indicate that the Convention ran into technical and practical difficulties from the very beginning.

Mr Amanullah Khan, the chief and the all-in-all of the JKLF, does not seem to have realised the meaning of the proverb "haste makes waste." When he was in America two years ago, he issued a statement in haste that Professor Mushirul Haque the Vice Chancellor of Kashmir University and two others with him "must have been killed by the Students Liberation Front [SLF] in Kashmir by now." The fact at that time was that they had not been killed. But when Amanullah's statement was broadcast by the radio, the students in Srinagar got the signal and killed the Professor and two others. This killing brought a bad name to the *Mujahideen* in Kashmir. The five leaders who have been released after two years incarceration in Kashmir have decried the killing of the Vice Chancellor and said that it in no way helped the freedom struggle.

And it was in 1990 that Amanullah formed a "provisional government of independent Kashmir" in Muzaffarabad. He later on confided to a friend that somebody had rung him up from Saudi Arabia that Jamaat-i-Islami of Kashmir was forming a parallel government for Kashmir and therefore he had tried to pre-empt that. The formation of that imaginary government resulted in division of the JKLF, which is continuing to this day.

And now he has announced the holding of a "Qaumi Conference" at Rawalakote. Nobody can question his or anybody's right to convene a national, or even international Conference on Kashmir or any other subject. But once you take decisions individually, then you have also to bear the consequences. One hundred thirty invitations have been sent to different people in Indian-held Kashmir. Most of the invitees are unknown persons. One or two died long ago. The suffix "notable" has been added to the names of the invitees most of whom seem to be hand-picked individuals, with no representative character. The list of the invitees from Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and the rest of the world has not been made public.

No doubt leaders of the parties and groups which are arrayed against the Indian rule in Kashmir have also been invited, though they are outnumbered by nincompoops and unknown individuals who have been invited. Mr Amanullah should have known that the freedom-fighter parties of Kashmir have organised themselves into a "Tehreek-e-Huriyyate Kashmir" and they have also set up a representative alliance of 13 parties in Azad Kashmir [AK] and Pakistan. Would it not have been proper to consult their representatives and partymen in AK and Pakistan about the venue, the date and place and the agenda of the Conference? This in fact is the reason for the poor response which has been given to the Conference by the invitees of Indian-held Kashmir.

An eleven-parties alliance of Azad Kashmir parties for the liberation of Kashmir was also formed in Islamabad three years ago and Mr Amanullah himself was elected General Secretary. The Muslim Conference, being the ruling party of Azad Kashmir, is also in that alliance, but the JKLF chief did not care to consult this alliance also for the conference. It is also to be noted that Major General Hayat Khan, chief of the 24 groups alliance and former President of Azad Kashmir, who also heads the Muslim League of Azad Kashmir, has also dissociated from the Conference. Sardar Abdul Qayyum, the AK Prime Minister, also came to know about the Conference from the press.

On technical grounds, the 130 invitees from Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir would be holding Indian passports. How strange would it look that we would have 130 Indian passport holders, including 41 non-Muslims in Azad Kashmir and the Azad Kashmir Government not knowing anything about it beforehand! There would be the question of security and the safety of invitees involved in the matter.

From the practical point of view, it seems to be a jump into the dark, like the one which the JKLF chief took when he formed the imaginary Government of independent Kashmir at Muzaffarabad, with himself as spokesman, and with no president, prime minister or anything of the sort. It is also like the Quixotic adventure of crossing the Line of Actual Control which Mr Khan undertook in February and March this year, leaving six poor souls dead on this side of the Line with the hero of the piece safe and sound in his home along with his "comrades without arms."

The AK Prime Minister is grumbling that he himself had been planning to hold such a conference but Amanullah has tried to hijack his idea and has even accused him of sabotaging the idea. It is for the JKLF Chief to explain what is his purpose behind organising such a conference, and what purpose it could serve, when, on the very outset, it has run into difficulties, justifying the Urdu saying: *Sar mundate he olay par gayay*. The idea already seems to have misfired. The Convenor has tried to eat humble pie by fixing a new date, i.e., 24 August, for the show. I am afraid the prospects in this direction would not be better than they are now. Let us wait and watch.

Alliance Said Forming Between Kashmiri Militant Groups

92AS1302A Lahore ZINDGI in Urdu 20 Jun 92 p 10

[Article by Syed Mazmal Hussein: "Alliance Between Hizb-E-Mujahadeen and Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front"]

[Text] If you listen to any radio station or read a newspaper in the world, you face heartrending news about the inhumanity in occupied Kashmir. The Indian military has started a tradition of atrocities that are unprecedented in history. Molestation of women is a

daily occurrence. Children and old people are used for practice to commit atrocities.

The people of occupied Kashmir are demonstrating their patience against the enemy in a strange way, and during the last four years, the way they have confronted the enemy could be considered a "decoration" on the forehead of humanity.

Against the background of all this killing and bloodshed, the news from occupied Kashmir that was received here recently could be called good news in a real sense. According to it, the two mujahed groups in Kashmir, Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin and the Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), have decided to join forces against the Indian Army. Is this not good news? Is not the unity of these two groups like an atom bomb against India?

Mr. Maqbul Butt formed the JKLF. He sacrificed his life to make Kashmiris hate India. Mr. Maqbul Butt, who sacrificed his life in Delhi in 1984, is respected by every Kashmiri today. The success that this mission accomplished during its eight years of leadership can be considered as setting a record for all freedom campaigns.

The Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin is the military wing of Sayyed Gailani's Jamaat-i Islami party. It was established in 1989. Its current military leader is Sayyed Sallaudin. As a result of Sayyed Sallaudin's efforts, the Indian Janata Party's "Ektra Yatra" (unity march) shrunk from thousands of volunteers to only 40 to 45 persons.

In addition to these two parties, there are several other parties active in occupied Kashmir. However, India has formed conspiracies specifically to make these two parties fight one another. India monitors its enemies very closely.

Every patriotic Kashmiri and friend of Kashmir considers the differences between these two parties very harmful to the mission of Kashmir's freedom. After the development of the situation in Afghanistan, when Najib fell from power, Kashmiris suddenly woke up, and the leaders of both parties met together and decided that India was a common enemy and that they would work together against it. They also decided that anyone who tried to increase enmity between the two parties would be considered an agent of the enemy. (News report published on 25 May 1992.)

How the leaders of these two parties arrived at this conclusion is something they can discuss on their own; however, the important thing is that we commend the leaders of both parties and hope that this atmosphere of mutual trust persists. India and its agents will definitely try to end this atmosphere of trust. The Kashmiri mujaheddin understand India's tricks very well now. They know well that the Indian soldiers that let out volleys of bullets do not care whether their target is a member of the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin or the JKLF. The Indian soldiers that rape our women do not care which party they belong to, or how old they are. It does not matter to him whether she is a 10-year-old child, a 20-year-old

young woman, or a 70-year-old elderly woman. The Indian soldiers have neither shame nor pride.

In order to preserve this unity, the leaders of the two parties have formed a simple and sure formula. Any person who tries to raise previous differences will be called an agent of the enemy. It does not matter how high that person is placed, or how honest or sincere he appears to be from the outside.

No one can disagree on this point of the two parties: their goal is the independence of Kashmir from India. As for the argument of either joining Pakistan or remaining independent, now is not the right time to discuss it. This argument should be set aside as soon as possible. A decision on it should be made after Kashmir is independent. One can say definitely that Kashmiris will not join the people who raped their mothers, sisters, daughters, and wives. No civilized person in the world can even imagine the torture that the Kashmiris are facing now. What can we expect of a nation that cannot distinguish between its friends and its enemies?

This good news coming from occupied Kashmir is a pleasant incident between news of a victory in Kabul and a victory in Sri Nagar. Our greetings go to Sayyed Sallaudin and Javed Ahmed Mir. Our greetings go to every member of the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin and the JKLF.

Internal Affairs

President, Prime Minister Said Losing Credibility

92AS1263K Lahore THE FRIDAY TIMES in English
9 Jul 92 p 1

[Editorial: "Contending With Bhutto"]

[Text] When President Ishaq dismissed Benazir Bhutto for corruption and inefficiency, many people believed him. They supported his action in the hope that the demise of her government might usher in a period of clean, stable, consensus politics.

But no, we live and learn. Today, the reputations of President Ishaq and PM [Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif are in shreds, Bhutto's stature has been partly vindicated and political power is up for grabs once again.

The President's credibility began to sour soon after he set up an interim government designed to defeat Bhutto at the polls. The references against her followed, and her husband was imprisoned on charges of terrorism and murder. After the most controversial polls in Pakistan's history, the President unleashed Jam Sadiq and the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] on the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] in Sindh, hounding it to distraction and laying waste to the province.

The Veena Hayat episode put paid to the hopes of those who still believed in the President. As his son-in-law ran amuck, the President put on his blinkers and retreated

into a bunker. When Nawaz Sharif launched his plans to plunder Pakistan, the President's stony silence didn't fool anyone. Now his chickens have come home to roost; no less than the COAS [Chief of Army Staff] has branded the MQM, a party the President has molly-coddled endlessly, a terrorist organisation. How can anyone pin an iota of faith on President Ishaq any more?

As for Mian Nawaz Sharif, one by one, his alliance partners—Messrs Jatui, Qazi Hussain and Altaf Bhai—have departed, disillusioned and bitter, harbouring thoughts of vengeance. If he is still in Islamabad, it is only because he is desperately clinging to the coat-tails of an increasingly wayward President.

Two years ago, Benazir Bhutto didn't know whether she was coming or going. She fended off conspiratorial assaults by Nawaz Sharif, dueled with President Ishaq and Gen Aslam Beg over power-sharing, and got no respite from the MQM in Sindh. Since she was kicked out into the cold, it has been a long, hard grind for her. But, at the end of the day, she seems to have been vindicated and is fighting fit.

The Presidential cases against her in the special courts have not amounted to anything in 21 months and have lost credibility. Her husband has been acquitted in two of the four cases against him, while in the third, the main accused is scot free even as Zardari languishes in prison. The charges of corruption against her have paled into minor indiscretions compared to stories of plunder against Nawaz Sharif. Her resilience, and that of her husband, in the face of naked oppression by Jam Sadiq and victimisation by President Ishaq has begun to evoke sympathy.

Bhutto's strategy to improve her footing after Gen Beg's retirement is no secret. Realising that Gen Asif Nawaz is a professional soldier, unfazed by the political acrimony of the past, she has seized the opportunity to make up with the army. She supported Gen Nawaz's efforts to rebuild relations with the U.S. and backed his efforts to revise Pakistan's Afghan policy. After Jam Sadiq's death, she has laboured to consolidate her contacts with the army. When President Ishaq asked the COAS to persuade Bhutto to accept Mr Muzaffar Shah as chief minister of Sindh, she read the situation correctly and agreed. When the army cracked down on Sindhi separatists and dacoits, she didn't oppose the action. When it targeted the MQM, she was delighted. Muzaffar Shah's majority has evaporated and left him at her mercy. More significantly, with several Sharif loyalists bitterly critical of Gen Asif Nawaz, cracks have appeared within the ruling troika and Bhutto thinks she is in with a chance again.

"This is Pakistan's darkest hour," says Benazir Bhutto, "Ishaq and Sharif should resign." She is calling for fresh elections and supports the idea of a constitutional role for the army in any future power-sharing arrangement. She is also threatening to resign from all the assemblies if

her demands aren't met, which could provoke a crisis for both President Ishaq and PM Sharif.

Bhutto is looking good mainly because the President and PM are both looking bad. The President's stubborn partisanship has embarrassed even his most loyal supporters. "Maybe it is time for the old man to call it a day," they say. As for the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad], it has lost its *raison d'être* and Nawaz Sharif's parliamentary majority is looking decidedly thin.

"Bhutto retains her vote bank while Nawaz is rapidly losing his," admit IJI loyalists privately, "the only way out is for him to affect a working compromise with her; otherwise there will be martial law in Pakistan." The Generals think that Bhutto has learnt her lessons and is being quite sensible now. Even the Jamaat-i-Islami, formerly a resolute PPP [Pakistan People's Party] foe, has changed its stance: "The PPP is a patriotic party which believes in the integrity and solidarity of Pakistan." This is a far cry from August 1990 when the Pakistani establishment and the religious lobby conspired to keep Benazir Bhutto out of politics for all time to come. But it is a reality our rulers must contend with, and quickly.

Chances of Imposition of Martial Law Viewed

92AS1303D Karachi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
30 Jun 92 p 3

[Editorial: "Shadows of Martial Law"]

[Text] The political crisis that started in Sindh has become very serious and is progressing toward the center, and political circles are seeing democracy in danger. Mr. Liaqat Baloch, the parliamentary leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, expressed his fear in the National Assembly that the shadows of a martial law regime are lengthening. He also advised political parties to unite. Similarly, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan said that the country was nearing martial law very fast. Pir Pagara was even more blunt than these two leaders. He said that nothing was in the president's control, and that he was "just a tourist here." Others have expressed similar feelings also.

The failure of democracy and the imposition of martial law is not good for our country. This is not a solution to the problem; it complicates the problems even more. The responsibilities of the army also increase, and it cannot concentrate on the delivery of its main duties. In addition, when martial law ends and power is transferred to the people, then the flaws and drawbacks of martial law are shared in such a way that the armed forces get nothing but notoriety. The experiences and incidents of the past support this.

There is the historical truth that one part of our country was lost when martial law was imposed here. That is why the military does not want to interfere in politics now. However, it is our national misfortune that the political leaders and those who claim to represent the people have

created such a situation because of their misdeeds and inefficiencies that our democracy has again been endangered. Various fears are emerging, and people have started to make assumptions.

How did this crisis happen, and who is responsible for it? In looking for an answer to this question, we must say that our government is responsible for this situation and the present crisis. In order to achieve law and order in Sindh and to control robbers, instigators, and terrorists, the military was asked to initiate Operation Cleanup under constitutional Article 147. The military started this campaign very efficiently; however, when some innocent people were murdered at Tandu Bahawal, near Jam Shoru, this campaign took a new turn. Military officials accepted the responsibility for this accident and concluded the situation by disciplining its members.

During this time, some political circles began to complain that the military operation was being implemented in inner Sindh only. Just to get rid of this complaint and to remove some misunderstandings, the military began activities in Karachi, and its first target was the MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement], which is a supporting party of the IJI. As a result of the military operation, the facts revealed about the MQM put the government in jeopardy. Now a new crisis has emerged because of the mass resignation of MQM cabinet and assembly members.

As a principle, every person involved in terrorism and the operation of torture cells should be investigated according to the law. Therefore, a person's resignation makes no difference here. At this time, a strange situation has emerged, and the state government seems to have become totally impotent. The prime minister seems to be so disassociated with the situation in Sindh that he does not even think it necessary to visit Karachi. He is also avoiding saying anything openly. Meanwhile, the chief of army staff believes that political operations are also dangerous now, because new political leadership might hinder the military operation, resulting in still more new problems.

If the government really wants to establish law and order in Sindh, if criminals are to be sent to jail, and at the same time, democratic and political action in the nation is to continue, then the government must take the initiative to control the situation. If political coalitions are made and similar horse trading is practiced, then the situation will worsen. Similar efforts were made in East Pakistan in 1971 against the Awaami League after the military operation. They did not benefit anyone. The cabinet formed under Dr. Abdul al-Malik, interim elections for some seats, and efforts to get the support of some Awami League leaders in order to weaken Sheikh Mujib-ul Rahman did not produce any positive results. In addition to the military operation, important work at political levels must also be done in Sindh. However, in order to do it, one must have clean and honest politics.

Government Said Compromising National Security
92AS1263E Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
 4 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Ghani Eirabie: "We Should Stop Gambling on National Security"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Forbidden to bet on race-horses, we have taken to gambling on national security: and seem smug at our success in loading the dice against it. The dice-loading manifests itself in four distinct ways. One, our hazardous reliance on a single 40-year-old oil-tanker as the only means of meeting our total national requirement of oil imports; two, our utter dependence on a solitary commercial sea-port to handle not only oil supplies but also shipments of food grains, medicines, machinery, industrial raw material, arms and equipment for civilian and military use; three, our fervent hope that the single-track railway line and the single-lane Grand Trunk Road running north-south will never be blocked by flood, accident or enemy sabotage; and four, our pious prayer that India will never discover how vulnerable we are to any Indian naval action.

Pakistan has no overland trade worth the name. Our northwestern neighbour Afghanistan, claiming the privilege of a land-locked state, carries out its entire import-export trade through Pakistan; and our consumer-population belt east of the Indus, is too far removed from the transport network of Iran to develop commercial relations with it. Which means our trade is almost entirely overseas, conducted primarily through the solitary seaport of Karachi. Port Qasim is not an independent second port; it is a twin facility, barely 50 miles away; and any natural calamity or labour strike hitting the area, will simultaneously disable both.

Such complete dependence on a single seaport means that any prolonged interruption of supplies exceeding two weeks, more specifically oil, of which we need to import a tankerload every third day, could cause our war machine—tanks, ships and aircraft—and our civilian production, to grind to a halt. This means India could blockade Pakistan into submission without firing a single shot.

Even though Pakistan is not as helpless today as it was in 1971, when the Indian Navy did blockade and blast Karachi port installations including oil storages, our vulnerability still is perilously high. The Pakistan Navy's outdatedness can be gauged from the fact that its flagship *Babar* is over 25 years old and is barely as large as the 5,300-ton nuclear submarine, India borrowed from U.S.S.R. and certainly no match for the 28,000-ton *Hermes* recently commissioned as India's second aircraft carrier. Compared with India's massive three-fleet blue-water navy, Pakistan's navy looks like a coastal flotilla.

Even more fascinating is our infatuation for antiques leaving aside the 40-year-old oil-tanker, during 1978-83, we acquired six *Gearing* class destroyers from U.S.A., none younger than 38 years and at least half of them

have to be urgently retired. Spurning the new frigates offered us by U.K. in 1987, we have gone in for another batch of tired-out surface ships—not as old as the *Gearings*, but still not young enough at 20. We have acquired eight of the *Brooks* and *Garcia* 3,500-ton frigates on lease from U.S.A. and it is not good taste looking a gift horse in the mouth. Undoubtedly they are still serviceable and half of them have anti-aircraft missiles and weapons system against submarines and as such quite useful.

But they are, nevertheless, nowhere near the state-of-art capability. They will perhaps have to be phased out in another 10 years or so, necessitating a fresh search for replacement. In the meantime, cost-benefit studies need to be undertaken to determine how wise it would be to invest in latest equipment to put into ships that are too old to last long. The same problem applies to the two *Leander* class ships obtained from the British in 1988.

The Pakistan Navy would much rather have half the ships that are new and modern than repeatedly condemned to make do with vessels that are outdated—some no better than "mobile scrap." Unable to match India in quantity, Pakistan should seek to make up for it in quality, as we have done in the case of the Pakistan Air Force. Barely one-fourth of India in combat aircraft strength we have sought to redress the balance by putting emphasis on quality—acquiring F-16s—and this has proved an effective deterrent. The reason for discarding the proven principle in case of the Navy is not clear. True, as a poor country, we cannot afford a larger defence budget, but there is no convincing reason for restricting the Navy's share of it to barely seven per cent of the available funds, that is barely enough to pay the personnel and to keep bolts and nuts in place; and there is no provision for any capital purchases. That is grossly unfair.

Conceding we have no desire to challenge India's blue water navy on the high seas nor to undertake to escort Indonesian or Malaysian supply ships coming up north across the Indian Ocean, we certainly will need to protect our own coastal shipping and defend at least a narrow stretch of the Arabian Sea from south of Port Qasim across the mouth of the Gulf of the entrance to the Red Sea, to offer protection to our life-sustaining imports and exports including oil and textiles. We shall be shown out of any Gulf security arrangement unless we make good on our claim that we guard the backdoor to the oil-rich Gulf. Again, we shall fail to attract the transit trade of Central Asia unless we are strong enough to underwrite security of ships carrying precious import-export cargo of the Muslim republics.

This minimal national security agenda postulates a three-point action plan. One, establishment of a new commercial port-cum-naval base on the Mekran Coast; two, militarisation of the Mekran coast; and three, opening up of additional transport routes from Central Asia to the Mekran coast.

No elaborate facts and figures are needed to make the point that the solitary seaport of Karachi is already choked to capacity and it is extremely vulnerable as a naval base. Barely managing to meet the demands of the still undeveloped economies of Pakistan and Afghanistan, Karachi port facilities will not be able to cope with the requirements of more developed economies and certainly not of the additional 50-million population of Central Asia looking for an exit to the sea. Turkey is seeking to attract them with its appeal to the common Turkic stock and language and Iran offers them geographic proximity and petro-dollars; but all that Pakistan can tempt them with is the shortest transit route to the sea, which can be an irresistible temptation in view of the fact that all the Central Asian Muslim republics are landlocked states; and we shall be missing an opportunity of a century if we fail to capitalise on the only advantage we enjoy.

We have four ways to ship Central Asian cargo down to the sea. One, by railway from Landikotal through Peshawar to Karachi and from Chaman through Quetta to Karachi. Two, by the Grand Trunk Road running from Peshawar through Lahore and Hyderabad to Karachi. Three, by the under-construction Indus Highway from Peshawar through Kohat, Dera Ghazi Khan and Larkana to Karachi. And four, by restoration of the British-era "Indus Waterway" from Kalabagh to Sukkur and thence to Karachi or Port Qasim.

The most expensive means of transportation is road and the cheapest, water; railway comes in between. The comparative saving in energy consumption is illustrated by the fact that while 800,000 bushels of wheat weighing 23,000 tons can be carried over water by a string of 15 barges towed by a single tug, the same bulk of grain would require an estimated two-and-a-half trains of 100 jumbo-wagons each, or some 900 trucks occupying 36 miles of highway and crowding out all other traffic.

Costwise, while moving one ton of freight over one kilometer costs 50 paisa by road and 15 paisa by rail, the comparative cost by water is just four paisa. Also, waterways are better suited for some categories of cargo such as coal and iron-ore; sand, stones and minerals; chemicals and commodities with corrosive, explosive, flammable, toxic or radio-active potential—which in any case should not be shipped by road or railway passing through populated areas.

In an expert appraisal of the 25 studies ordered so far by the Pakistan Government on prospects of navigation in the Indus the Port Qasim Authority concludes: there are no unmanageable obstructions to safe navigation in the Indus from Kalabagh to Sukkur for boats drawing about 2.5 metres for nine months of the year and 1.5 metres for the rest. With more capital investment, navigation from Sukkur down to Port Qasim is also feasible.

While the civilian authorities push ahead with projects to convert GTR into dual-carriageway along its entire length from Peshawar to Karachi and complete the Indus

Highway and streamline railways on top priority basis, the Pakistan Navy or a subsidiary of it should assume direct responsibility for the Indus Waterway, restoring the Indus flotilla the British operated with considerable success until the close of the last century.

Again, it is the Navy which should spearhead the drive for a second commercial port and naval base on the Mekran coast. Combining the two reduces costs and the Navy has a stake in both from the professional-cum national security point of view. The most plausible site for such a project is offered by fishing harbours on the Mekran coast, including Miani Khor, Ormara, Khor Kalamat, Pasni, Gwadar and Jiwhani, each lying at the mouth of a flood-water river. A decision has already been taken to develop Gwadar as a second commercial port, but there are reports suggesting that the Pakistan Navy does not favour it as a naval base for reasons of national security—probably holding that it is far too removed from the backup facilities required to sustain it and far too close to the "explosiveness" of the Gulf.

The Navy reportedly supports Ormara for a naval base, nearly 200 miles west of Karachi. Some civilian experts too question Gwadar on grounds that its commercial potential will be severely limited by the absence of any road, rail or river transportation network behind it. They also maintain that Gwadar is too far away from the road-rail-river system bringing down cargo from Central Asia. They want a port near enough to link up to the Indus Highway through a feeder-line—which again would tend to point to Ormara. Whatever it be, there is need for more specialised studies to finally determine the most suitable location for a new commercial port-cum-naval base on the Mekran coast.

With the nucleus of global tension hovering over the Gulf, we cannot leave undefended the 700-mile long Mekran coast that forms the outer arm of the strategic waterway. We must militarise it quickly—dotting the coastline with air strips and naval anchorages and shore battery sites. We need to accord the highest priority to obtaining submarine spotting *Orion* aircraft and latest models of submarines and *Osaka*-type missile-boats to patrol the coastline. This will not only impart credibility to our claim that we guard the backdoor to the Gulf but also establish that we are willing and able to protect the transit facilities we are offering to the landlocked Muslim republics of Central Asia.

In no case should we present a picture of vulnerability that will tempt India to declare oil a contraband and embolden them to board our ships and blockade us into submission without firing a shot.

PPP, JI Said Working Jointly Against IJI
92AS1305E Karachi JANG (supplement) in Urdu
6 Jul 92 p II]

[Article by Hamid Mir from Lahore: "Efforts for Cooperation Between People's Party and Jamaat-i-Islami"]

[Text] Senator Qazi Hussain, head of Jamaat-i-Islami [JI], called a meeting in Karachi of the Jamaat-i-Islami Sindh consultative assembly on 8 July. Leaders of JI in the meeting will discuss cooperation with the [Pakistan] People's Party [PPP], JUP [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan], JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam], Functional Muslim League, and True MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement]. It should be noted that on 1 July the leaders of Jamaat-i-Islami made a telephone call from Lahore to the True MQM leaders in Karachi; and on the same day, PPP leaders Faruq Laghari and Tariq Rahim held detailed talks in Mansura with Amir Qazi Hussain, leader of Jaamat-i-Islami. The leaders of PPP and JI are also busy establishing contacts with the leaders of JUI, JUP and the Functional Muslim League. A few weeks ago, regular contacts were established between the PPP and JI but were later discontinued. However, following the criticism of the army operation in Sindh by Punjab's chief minister Ghulam Haidar Wain and federal minister Chaudhary Nisar Ali, opposition parties are again establishing relations with each other. Certain sources report that on 8 July, JI leaders will decide in Karachi whether or not to meet with Benazir Bhutto. JI sources are very optimistic that Benazir and Qazi Hussain Ahmad will meet soon. It is said that regular cooperation between the PPP and JI will be arranged through joint peace committees in Karachi. In addition to the PPP and JI, these committees will include the representatives of other major parties who will cooperate with the army in the restoration of law and order in Karachi. PPP leader Farooq Laghari said in a press conference in Lahore on 2 July that Qazi Hussain Ahmad had promised to cooperate with the PPP in removing the present government. He referred to an interview given by federal minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali and said that the minister had acknowledged that during Benazir's term of office, former chief of the army staff Mirza Aslam Beg had broken up the agreement between PPP and MQM and thrown the latter into IJI's arms. Faruq Laghari maintained that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Mirza Aslam Beg had worked jointly to bring down the PPP government and put Nawaz Sharif in office. Laghari accused the president as well as the prime minister of knowing about the reported MQM torture chambers in Karachi but remaining silent about it. [Laghar said?] that now that the torture chambers in Karachi are liquidated, the prime minister expected the Sindh operation to be directed against his allies; that was why he had asked Ghulam Haidar Wain to express opposition to the Sindh operation. Laghari also said that the prime minister and the president were working together to keep the chief of the army staff from conducting an impartial operation; but Laghari insisted, "We will not support martial law under any circumstances."

PPP circles say, "The army wants to take action against certain individuals within our ranks; if these individuals are in fact 'black sheep,' we will not condemn any such action by the army." It seems as though the PPP knows which of its members are being targeted by the army and the PPP leaders regard these individuals as "black

sheep;" hence, rather than hinder the Sindh operation, the PPP has decided to support it directly and indirectly. This is the first time that some senior members of the PPP are supporting any army action; Tariq Rahim is even saying that the prime minister, the president, and MQM are all one side and the army is alone on the other side; therefore the PPP should support the army.

Leading politicians from Pakistan's four provinces will meet in Lahore on 9 July to deliberate on the crisis in Sindh; the meeting has been arranged by the Waris Mir Foundation, which is arranging a seminar on the Sindh crisis to be held on 9 July. Those participating in the seminar are Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Sayed Qaim Ali Shah, Abdul Hafiz Pirzadah, and Maulana Shah Ahmad Nurani from Sindh; Ajmal Khatak or Wali Khan from the Northwest Frontier Province (Qazi Hussain Ahmad will participate in the seminar in a private capacity; Senator Manzur Gachki of the Jamhoori Watan Party and JUI Senator Hafiz Hussain Ahmad from Balochistan province. Senator Ishtiaq Azhar has also been invited to the seminar. Lahore's various political and nonpolitical organizations are preparing a welcoming reception for the politicians from Sindh, which proves that the educated people here are not closing their eyes to the Sindh crisis but wish to hear the views of individuals from different schools of thought. Punjabi intellectuals are trying to understand whether the Sindh operation is directed against any one party or against unsavory elements in all parties. If the people of Punjab think that the operation is directed towards criminals and undesirable individuals in all parties, in the next few days they will come out in the streets to support the operation. Certain political parties are demanding that a similar operation be undertaken in Punjab as well. Nawabzadah Nasrullah Khan is emphasizing the need for such an operation from Karachi to Khaiber. It remains to be seen if following the operation in Sindh, another such operation will be considered necessary for Punjab. Political analysts think that the federal government asked the army to enter Sindh but will not commit the mistake of asking the army into Punjab. Some think that after the end of the month of Moharram [1-30 July], PPP will join other parties in Punjab to start another campaign. PPP circles say that after Moharram, they will start a final round [of campaigns] against the government, which will end in either the ouster of the ruling authorities or the appearance of "someone else" on the scene. If a wider political alliance is forged among political parties opposed to the government, it remains to be seen whether the present government goes out or "someone else" comes in.

IJI Said Looking for New Political Partners

92AS1263D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by Mohammad Saleh Zaafr: "IJI Trying To Widen Its Base"]

[Text] Islamabad, July 8—The ruling Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), after losing support of 12 Members of National Assembly belonging to MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] due to their resignations, has decided to broaden its political base in and outside Parliament, in order to make up the deficiency.

According to authentic sources, Ch Nisar Ali Khan, Special Assistant to Prime Minister and Federal Minister, who established contacts with the former allies of the IJI during last week, briefed Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif Wednesday before the latter's departure for Karachi, about the outcome of his initial contacts with important political figures. Both of them were reported satisfied with the results.

Ch Nasir Ali Khan had marathon parleys with Senator Prof Khurshid Ahmed, Naib Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami last week, met Senator Qazi Hussain Ahmad, chief of the Jamaat at Lahore and returned late Tuesday evening. He was satisfied with the discussions which he had with Qazi Sahib and informed the Premier about the views of the Amir of the Jamaat, who had assured the Special Assistant to PM [Prime Minister] that the Jamaat would not support any undemocratic move against the present government. The Jamaat had also made it clear that it would not join hands with the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] in its efforts to dislodge the present government. Sources said that the Jamaat had also declined to come back into the fold of the IJI.

Elahi Bukhsh Soomro, Federal Minister for Science and Technology, who had lengthy meetings with the leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulami Islam (JUI) succeeded in arranging their meeting with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and is now working to seek their support for Nawaz Sharif's administration. It is expected that a meeting between Ch Nisar Ali Khan and the leaders of the JUI would be worked out towards the end of next week. These leaders will also have a meeting with Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif at a later stage.

Sources said that the Jamiat-ul-Ulami Pakistan [JUP], (JUI-Noorani group) had also been contacted by the Prime Minister's Special Assistant, and the effort showed success since Maulana Hamid Saeed Kazmi, JUP MNA [Member of National Assembly], met the Premier last month. Some leaders of the JUP may also meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during his current visit to Karachi. Some political parties which are components of the APC [All Parties Conference], would also be contacted by the IJI stalwarts if the initial contacts show positive results, sources close to the IJI indicated.

The contacts between the JUP of Maulana Noorani and the IJI have significance in view of the campaign against Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, by a group of Members of Parliament. The IJI can accommodate the JUP of Maulana Noorani in place of one member of Maulana Niazi's JUP, if the moves proceed accordingly.

The IJI government, which came into power 20 months ago with 2/3rd support of the Members of National Assembly, after departure of its major allies, the MQM, Jamaat-e-Islami and the National People's Party (NPP), still enjoys the support of more than 140 Members of National Assembly, which form comfortable majority and the Opposition is supported by well above 50 Members of National Assembly. The fresh moves by the IJI might be helpful to the government to reach once again close to its initial strength, the IJI sources said.

Editorial Views Possibilities for MQM Leader

92AS1303A ZINDGI in Urdu 4 Jul 92 pp 4-5

[Editorial: "Mr Altaf Hussein's Future"]

[Text] The way the MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement] torture cells in Karachi were uncovered, and the way the group of militants hiding behind them were brought to the public eye, has changed the situation in such a manner that it is impossible to forecast where this campaign will now go.

The two factions of the MQM are fighting with each other. Altaf Hussein's group announced that the members of national and state assemblies will resign, but we have not learned from any reliable source which assembly members have sent resignations written with their own hands and whose written letters have already been sent to the speaker of the assembly. The MQM leadership of the Altaf faction is not coming out into the public; it is functioning like an underground organization.

It is very difficult to tolerate stories about torture, barbarism, and immoral acts. Who will be declared responsible for these, and who will be punished? All of this is being kept secret. The way the government and its agencies have been hurt by this cannot be described in words.

No one is currently able to control the speed of all these incidents. The state and federal governments are still acting stunned. Mr. Ghulam Haider Wain, Punjab's chief minister, announced openly that this military operation is not being executed fairly. He said that action is now being taken against the al-Zulfiqar instigators. It was also published that Nisar Ali, special adviser to the prime minister, suddenly began to cry in the middle of a high-level meeting. He said that the army was being used to target the MQM instead of the robbers.

Chaudhary Nisar Ali's reaction was leaked from a closed meeting; however, Ghulam Haider Wain made his announcement in the presence of hundreds of people. It is commonly understood that he has the prime minister's support. Mr. Wain is also secretary general of Punjab's Muslim League. Anything he says cannot be ignored. Whatever effect his words have, one thing is clear: What is happening in Sindh is not happening according to the federal government's plan. It has let the genie out of the bottle and is very nervous about its reaction.

The leaders have not formed a clear stand on the action against the MQM. However, the associates of the government have "put the molehill out there" for anyone to make a mountain out of.

This situation indicates clearly that the military action against the instigators will not be digested. Pakistani politicians have not succeeded in their desires to use them against each other. If we look at Mr. Altaf Hussein's politics against this background, then we cannot say that he can be hanged.

In our country, no court or investigative action can be eliminated from political action. The case against Sheikh Mujib was very strong, and Mr. Bhutto was sentenced to hang after years of hearings. The case against Mujib then had to be dropped, and the president of our country was forced to start political talks with him. Meanwhile, there was a group powerful enough to declare Mr. Bhutto a martyr. When this group came to power, it officially declared him one.

The case of Altaf Hussein is different from those of Bhutto and Mujib, because he has not been able to prove himself a "victim." Our national and international communications media are reading a crime sheet against him in such a way that he is unable to form a stand. In spite of all this, his future depends on his attitude. If he is a real politician and not a product of chance, then he should return to Pakistan immediately, confront the accusations levied against him, and demand hearings in a high-level court.

Be it Sheikh Mujib or Mr. Bhutto, both faced the situation by remaining in Pakistan. Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, the present PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leader, also stayed here and confronted the steel power of martial law by looking it in the eye. She also spent a long period of time behind bars. Maulana Sayyed Abualla Ali Modudi also heard his sentence to death while he was in jail. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan also stayed in Pakistani jails through various government terms. Any person who claims to be a political leader must learn the political protocols and adopt them. He should not eschew confrontation for fear of a case or its resulting punishment. A person who cannot confront the situation like a man should not try to put the noose on another neck either. A person like that can strangle himself. Therefore, in spite of this whole situation, Altaf Hussein's politics depend on himself, rather than on his enemies. If he and his party are political, then they must prove it now. Those who hide in mouseholes and look for "umbrellas of words" are not crowned. If, by some chance, they are, then they disappear along with their heads.

Reasons for Targeting MQM Examined

92AS1255A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
7 Jul 92 p 12

[Article by Ghazala Fasnia: "Operation Cleanup: Why Was MQM Targeted?"]

[Text] The state of Sindh, which has been a regular problem for our different governments, has been a target of various military operations in the past. To rid it of drugs, prejudice, and riots, various kinds of "clean-up operations" were implemented there. However, the current situation of the present "operation" under General Asif Nawaz was never experienced in the past. The eyes of not only Pakistan but also the whole world are on Sindh. They want to see what will happen in Sindh after this operation. Criticism, comments, and various assumptions are rampant. The bazaar of rumors is hot. The reason for the daily newspaper headlines and the resultant atmosphere is that this operation surprised everyone from the very beginning. The people are still puzzled. The situation of uncertainty gives birth to new rumors and assumptions. Before this operation was launched, there were talks about the possibility of military interference. The people expected the military operation to start within Sindh, just as in the past. After the arrest of some robbers, criminals, and political leaders, the dust would settle down. However, this did not happen. When the operation began, everyone's expectations proved to be wrong. The slickness and care of the criminal elements did not help them, and the military put its hand on the MQM in Karachi.

Before 19 June, no one could have imagined that the situation in Karachi, which is the stronghold of the MQM, would change so drastically that the leaders would be looking for shelter, steel gates would be broken, the central offices of the leadership would be surrounded by the military, and torture chambers would be discovered in information centers. In addition, people will hear new stories of atrocities daily from the mouths of MQM representatives. All of this has happened; however, it did not happen suddenly. The whole thing was planned. To understand it, one must look into the recent past. The MQM had landslide victories in the elections in Karachi and Hyderabad. This party was also surprisingly successful in many areas of inner Sindh also. Because of this popular support, the MQM had become indispensable to the new government. During the Benazir era, everyone knew from the close relationship between the MQM and Nawaz Sharif that the MQM would cooperate with Nawaz Sharif. That is what happened. The MQM made an unprecedented political gain during the tenure of the present government. It has 14 seats in the National Assembly and 28 seats in the State Assembly, where it is providing effective leadership. The surprising fact, however, is that the MQM was never satisfied with even this success. The MQM leadership, including Altaf Hussein and elected cabinet members demanded assurances for their continuing existence, sometimes from the federal government and at other times from the state government. The question arises: Why was the high command of this party so unsure of its future? Altaf Hussein had always complained about conspiracies against him. He did not succeed in working with Benazir during the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government. It could be said that the PPP did not follow up on its "agreement" with the MQM. This way, the union between the two ended.

They have been complaining about this government also. Iltaf Hussein was also worried about the danger of a revolt within the MQM ranks. There was repeated news of assassination attempts against him. As a result, the leader of the MQM, after his party was included in the government, began to spend most of his time in hospitals and abroad. It is obvious that Iltaf Hussein is suffering from fear, even after achieving so much power. He had the fear of enemy conspiracy, and he began to suspect his own people also. Perhaps all this reflected his weaknesses, which kept Iltaf Hussein from reaching his goals.

We said above that the plans for the present operation were made much earlier. One proof of this is Iltaf Hussein's absence from the scene of action. He has been living in London for a long time because of his health. Some circles have said that Iltaf Hussein was well aware of what was going to happen; therefore, he disappeared. Some other MQM leaders have also hinted that they knew this operation would be against them. However, all this happened so suddenly that the MQM leaders were not able to foresee this because of Iltaf Hussein's absence. As a result, the military had no problem finding its "target." One salient factor of this operation has been that the military was not directly involved in any activities against the MQM. The dissenting group of the MQM has become the scapegoat. The military was present in Sindh for several weeks; however, this operation began in Karachi, when the MQM started its internal fighting. This fighting was between the MQM and its dissenting group. Both Aamir and Aafaq were top MQM leaders at one time. They later left the party because of policy differences. They knew of the party's weakness when they were its leaders. A large number of party members also followed them. In addition, the MQM rival parties provided them with moral and financial support. This way, an unorganized and weak group was able to confront a much more organized and stronger MQM and was successful in breaking it up. The operation against the MQM was actually started when the real MQM members, which includes Aamir Khan, Aafaq Ahmed, Mansur Chacha, and Aziz, led the dissenting group in taking control of the Korangi Landhi Lines area sectors. Eight people were killed in these confrontations. However, it was the original party that was victorious. Soon after this event, curfew was imposed in these and other sensitive neighborhoods. The military interfered in order to investigate these incidents. As a result, the MQM emerged in a way never seen before. It amazed the people. What happened afterwards is known to everyone. The number of torture chambers discovered almost daily has now reached 23. The MQM's assembly members are openly resigning their positions. Many top party leaders have been arrested. The people wait for sensational news almost daily. After seeing this whole situation, the basic question is: What are the factors responsible for this situation? Can the MQM, which became successful in such a short time, fall so fast? Different people have various opinions about the establishment of the MQM. Its establishment is tied to

the Ziaul Haq government. He laid the party's foundation stone in order to obliterate the strength of Sindhi nationalists and the PPP. Some consider the party an Indian conspiracy or an international plan to make Karachi another Hong Kong.

If we ignore all these assumptions, one thing is definite: The MQM would not have become so strong in Sindh if the "refugees" in Sindh were not so deprived. The MQM was greatly successful at elections at the national, state, and even municipal committee levels, so much so that its rivals were not even close to it in the election. This success was not obtained simply by using terrorism. This proves that the MQM really represented the people. The Muhajirs also considered it their only party. Before the MQM was established, the PPP was the most popular party in Sindh. Other nationalist parties also existed there. Meanwhile, in urban Sindh, religious parties wielded a lot of influence. Among these, the Jamaat-i Islami was the most influential, and it had the opportunity to lead Karachi and Hyderabad for some time. The question of how the MQM was successful in this state, in spite of the presence of these political parties, is very important here. The fact is that the drawbacks of all these parties created an atmosphere conducive to the prospering of this ethnic party. The PPP leadership was suffering from a delusion of popularity among the people. This was wishful thinking, and it made it forget the smaller groups. This party did not pay attention to the Muhajir factor and the increasing feeling of deprivation among the Muhajir. The party spent most of its time strengthening itself in inner Sindh.

Against this background, the All Pakistan Muhajir Students' Organization (APMO) was established. The founder of this organization, Iltaf Hussein, used this platform for his political emergence. From here, he moved forward to establish the MQM. Iltaf Hussein wanted to use the Muttahda Qaumi Movement [United National Movement] to enter the nation's political mainstream. At that time, the operation against the MQM began. Since its establishment, the MQM led many successful campaigns. This party first became very popular in Karachi and Hyderabad by popularizing specific philosophies of the injustice to Muhajirs and by raising the slogan of a separate identity for Muhajir culture and traditions. The leadership of the party was in the hands of young people; therefore, the young Muhajirs gathered around it. Their success was very evident when the father of a family was a Jamaat-i Islami member, while his son was a follower of Iltaf Hussein. Iltaf Hussein was also very popular among women. It would be appropriate to say that Benazir, despite being a woman herself, could not get as much support as did Iltaf Hussein. He paid special attention to involving women in politics. Paying attention to "mothers and sisters" has become the MQM's tradition now. The practical demonstration of this popularity was evident in the 1990 elections. The MQM had participated in the elections for the first time. The majority of the people who voted for it were young people and women. A meaningful leadership had emerged on Sindh's horizons for the first time.

Under the leadership of Iltaf Hussein, the other MQM followers proved themselves to be the appropriate representatives of the people. They were able to prove their capabilities while participating in the government of Nawaz Sharif. Iltaf Hussein and other MQM leaders belong to the middle and lower classes; therefore, the MQM is more acceptable in our country's politics. The cabinet members and legislators of the MQM did not separate themselves from the people, even after joining the government. They paid attention to resolving people's problems. They provided employment to the Muhajirs. By establishing such interesting and attractive events as Cleanliness Week, the Free Market, Traffic Week, and Electricity Week, the MQM kept its attention focused on the people. Iltaf Hussein and his associates know the secret of being popular and acceptable among the people. They have always been successful in this area. There is no doubt that the MQM was very successful among the Muhajirs; however, it was not successful at the political front. Intelligence agencies were submitting reports about the weapons collection that the MQM had and its involvement in terrorism. A separate group emerged in opposition to the party's policies. This group gained more and more strength. It also told secret stories about the MQM to law enforcement agencies. Terrorists, thieves, and criminals had also joined the MQM. Using these elements as a basis, the operation against the MQM was launched.

The operation still continues. We cannot say what will happen in Sindh after the operation is finished. At present, the government of Sindh is helping the military. Some are saying that this operation against the MQM will be followed against such nationalist groups as al-Zulfikar. This situation can spread unrest not only in this state, but throughout the whole country. This interim period is very difficult for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. He had promised friendship with the MQM in the past, and the MQM leadership is reminding him of this promise. In response to it, he says that this operation is nonaligned, and that it is aimed against terrorists. No one can say how far this promise of objectivity will be followed. At the same time, a question is being asked among the people: Will the MQM be obliterated as a result of this operation? Will the real MQM prove itself able to live? Who will fill the vacuum created in the area of Muhajir leadership? Perhaps this atmosphere of uncertainty will end when the operation is concluded.

SSP Leader Interviewed on Shia-Sunni Conflict
92AS1015D Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
(Supplement) in English 8 May p 2

[Article by Saeed Minhas and Sarmad Tauseef; boldface, italicized words as published; first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text]

Interview

Maulana Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi [MZRF], heads the militant and sectarian organisation, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). A purely anti-Shia organisation, it works for the upkeep of the supremacy of Sahaba, the companions of Muhammad (PBUH) [Peace Be Upon Him] Sipah-e-Sahaba made its name following its involvement in the murder of Sadiq Ganji, Iranian Director-General of Khana Farhang-e-Iran. More recently it has received publicity by posing serious problems for the Punjab Chief Minister Ghulam Haider Wyne, first by winning the local bodies seats in Jhang and then by defeating the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] candidates in the recently held by-elections in Jhang.

Accompanied with a dozen of his followers and body guards adorned with sophisticated weapons, Maulana held a detailed discussion with THE FRONTIER POST and expressed his personal and party views regarding Shias, the real hand behind the ethnic rifts in Jhang, the intentions of the IJI Chief and Punjab Chief Minister towards Jhang and the militant face of the SSP [Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan].

FP: What is the real problem in Jhang and what do you think is the root cause?

MZRF: Shia-Sunni conflict is the real problem and this is based on two major realities, sectarianism and politics. Unless a solution to both of these is found, the possibility of any peace in Jhang will remain wishful thinking.

As far as the political background of this conflict is concerned, we believe that the late Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was murdered for daring to contest against the feudal lady of Jhang and not for delivering speeches against the Shia sect. Had it been this reason, he would have been murdered many years before because, in fact, the late Maulana had been delivering such speeches for 15 years.

The atmosphere in Jhang was very calm and friendly until the murder of Esar-ul-Qasmi. After that, the situation deteriorated rapidly. Now everyone, including the government and Shia leaders, have found an easy answer to what is happening in Jhang by blaming the SSP for every evil that occurs.

So who really is behind this game?

The Iranian government. It's as simple as that. It is spreading ethnic hatred in the country. Through Iranian Cultural Centres, it is trying to ring about a Khomeini-type revolution in Pakistan through Imam Bargahs with the alleged connivance of some Pakistani officials.

These cultural centres have long been supplying anti-Sahaba literature, arms and financial assistance to Shias. No other country has as many cultural centers in one country as Iran has in Pakistan, which are six at present. These so-called cultural centers are being used to chalk out plans against the major sect of the society, which undoubtedly is Sunni.

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan first informed the Benazir regime about the conspiracies hatched in a special meeting of six director-generals of Iranian Cultural Centers under the chairmanship of DG Military intelligence Iran. But for unknown reasons, the government remained reluctant to take any action, in spite of the fact that the different government agencies also endorsed the information in their reports.

Would you like to comment on the status of Syeda Abdia Hussain in Jhang politics and her present assignment?

Syeda Abida Hussain no longer has any influence in Jhang politics. People have now started realising that the SSP could serve them better than any feudal lady or her husband.

It is better to call her the ambassador of Israel than of Pakistan because of her love for Jewish policies. By issuing statements against the cause and interests of the Muslim Ummah, she has let down Pakistan in the whole Muslim Ummah. Mian Nawaz Sharif should remove her immediately.

How do you rate the present rulers and their intentions towards the Jhang problem?

Mian Nawaz Sharif is not sincere in solving the long standing problem of Jhang. Following fierce clashes between Shias and Sunnis, the government constituted a committee, headed by Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, to investigate the cause and to find a solution. The committee held its first—and so far the last—meeting and presented its report to the Prime Minister but the findings of the committee have been pending with the Prime Minister since September 1991.

How can you say that the government of Pakistan was involved in the clashes in Jhang?

We have solid proof of government involvement in the bloodshed which occurred during the last general elections. Just one hour before the murder of Maulana Esar-ul-Qasmi, the local police arrested some armed people who belonged to Chinuot, the constituency of a provincial minister, Malik Saleem Iqbal. After the murder of the late Maulana, the police again arrested the murderers who also belonged to the constituency of the same provincial minister. What more evidence do we need to believe that the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] ministers themselves are backing criminals for their political aims?

Do you foresee any end to the series of murders in connection with Shia-Sunni conflict?

As long as the Shia sect is not confined to its Imam Barghas and is not stopped from publishing contemptuous literature against Sahaba, no peace in the country, especially in Jhang, is possible. Neither can the law and order situation in Jhang be restored until the murderers of different Ulemas are arrested.

Tell us something about the militant image you have developed over the years?

Yes, we do have arms but they are legal and licensed and we only keep them to safeguard ourselves from the enemies. Nobody can prove that we have even a single illegal pistol in our possession or that we are involved in any illegal activity.

It is the SSP which has suffered in the whole affair and lost most of its religious scholars in this series of murders. Do you not think that we have the right to protect our lives?

The SSP has no personal rift with any of the Shia leaders or with any official of the Iranian government. But we opt to stand up against any attempt to defame the Sahaba or Sunni rites.

The Provincial Minister, Malik Saleem Iqbal, has accused the SSP of threatening to take his life. What is your response to this accusation?

We don't need to threaten anyone because we do not believe in threats but in actions. If we found that the Provincial Minister was involved in anti-SSP activities, we would not let him live any longer.

Can you tell us something about the recent Jhang by-elections?

The government intended to rig the elections on polling day but failed to do so because of the strict precautionary measures taken by the SSP. Although the government failed to rig elections on polling day it did, however, commit pre-poll rigging by spending over 20 crore rupees during the election campaign.

Do you agree with government spending on by-elections?

It is unjustified. In fact the government is making a mockery of public funds by spending it on the election campaign of the PML [Pakistan Muslim League] or IJI-backed candidates. Before the by-elections, the government promised the voters of the constituency to provide every house with electricity and gas but immediately after losing the elections, the government contractor tried to take away the electric poles and gas pipes which were lying on the roadsides. The SSP workers and Jhang people, though, did not allow them to take away any material brought there for the development work which they were promised.

Now that you have your men in the local bodies and the national assembly, can't you carry out the development work using the allocated funds?

The SSP is facing more problems than the elected members of opposition. Not even a single rupee from the Tameer-e-Watan programme has yet been released for our MNAs [Member of National Assembly]. The local administration of Jhang, however, has been asked not to cooperate with the SSP councillors and the elected members of parliament. Even the district administration

try to avoid the MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly], MNA or councillor of the SSP.

Haven't you talked to the Punjab Chief Minister about the non-availability of funds?

The Punjab Chief Minister lacks political orientation. Most of his decisions are based on emotionalism rather than rationalism. But still, the SSP would welcome Ghulam Haider Wyne with open arms in Jhang if he fulfilled his promise to provide everyone with Sui Gas which he publically promised during the last by-elections.

What are the future plans of the SSP?

We want to declare the country a Sunni state, banning the right of a woman to rule and to uphold the supremacy of Islam and Shariah in the country. We want a complete Khilafat system.

After contacting all the religious parties in the country, the SSP is considering moving a bill of amendment to the Constitution prohibiting blasphemy against Sahaba Karam. Hopefully we will get this passed in the National Assembly.

We also reject the Shariat Bill passed by the government as it was totally against the basics of Islam and negates the supremacy of the Quran. I would like to quote the clause of the bill which states that the "Quran and Sunnah would be the supreme law in the country, provided it has no contradiction with the present rules and regulations." This is totally against the spirit of Islam and proves that the people who drafted the bill do not even know the basics of Islam.

Sindh: Views, Developments, Commentaries

Policy Said Risky

92AS1219A Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
2 Jun 92 p 6

[First paragraph is *THE MUSLIM* introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Pointing out the recent reassertion of its professional identity by the military in Pakistan, and the critical nature of the country's security environment; Shireen M. Mazari maintains that dragging the army into the political quagmire of Sindh could be a case of severe disservice to the nation.

The decision to finally use the military in Sindh is a sorry reflection of the state of Pakistani polity. It is astounding that a generation that underwent the trauma of Bangladesh can be devoid of a frightful sense of déjà vu. As in 1971, the present decision to deploy the army in Sindh primarily reflects the success of the civilian ruling elite's deliberate policy of thwarting democratic process in Sindh based upon a narrow, short-term and self-destructive purpose of trying to eliminate the People's Party.

Not only did the President and the Central Government allow Jam Sadiq to run rampant in Sindh, they deliberately encouraged the violent feudal style of Jam Sadiq to dictate the political dynamics of Sindh—thereby ensuring the exacerbation of the polarisation in the province. The national leadership's mocking attitude towards democratic norms was exemplified by the power vested in the President's son-in-law, Mr Marwat, who ran riot in the province—especially in Karachi—with torture, rape and all manner of physical abuse becoming accepted means of dealing with any whimpering of opposition.

The approval from Islamabad for this form of governance in Sindh was reflected in the post-Jam period with Muzaffar Hussain Shah continuing the policies of his predecessor, and Mr Marwat providing the necessary continuity in policy implementation. That the urbane political liberalism and tolerance with which Mr Shah had been associated, quickly dissipated in the face of the harsh realities of the power game in Sindh, reflects the lack of any commitment to democratic principles and morality amongst the civilian political elite of the nation—regardless of where they are positioned on the Pakistani political spectrum. In fact, there does not seem to be a national political spectrum at all in terms of ideology or party agenda—other than an agenda of self-aggrandisement!

As has been the case in the nation's various efforts at establishing a democratic policy—be it in the early fifties or in the post-Bangladesh period—this subjugation of national interest to petty, internecine political rivalries and absolute intolerance of opposing forces has always undermined not only the fledgling roots of democracy but also the very fabric of a national synthesis.

The present scenario is rife with the same elements of disaster that have accompanied previous military interventions in the country—regardless of the type and the guise under which they have been initiated. To begin with, no national consensus exists amongst the political elite over the invocation of Article 147 for the present military deployment—despite claims to the contrary by the present Sharif government.

Equally confusing are the statements emanating from the President and the Prime Minister relating to the issue of Indian involvement in Sindh. While the President has stated that there is no solid proof about Indian involvement—with only circumstantial evidence acting as an indicator in this direction (*THE MUSLIM*, May 30, 92)—the Prime Minister has come out with a categorical accusation of Indian infiltration into Sindh.

In addition, he has involved the U.N. in Pakistan's Sindh problem by informing that organisation of Indian interference in Sindh. Again, it seems the leadership has forgotten the 1971 experience—where international interventionism in the army action in East Pakistan

became a critical factor in allowing India to mobilise the international community against Pakistan's militaristic policy in that province.

While it is perfectly credible to assume the role of the India factor in the unrest in Sindh, is it really desirable from the national perspective to internationalise what should remain an internal matter? By appealing to the U.N. and planning on sending emissaries to various countries to inform them of Indian interference in Sindh, the Sharif government is legitimising external comment and interventionism in what is basically a political problem which has been compounded by a law and order crisis.

Perhaps our elite's constant tampering with and rewriting of our history has led to a general pervasion of amnesia within the ruling elite's mental recesses—otherwise, the historical experience of 1971 should have served to make the Prime Minister more cautious and tempered in his exuberance of appealing to the international community on the Sindh issue.

Of course, in the final analysis, it is the lack of national consensus and the resort to the military for the resolution of a political conflict that are the most disturbing aspects of the decision to deploy the army in Sindh. In a province where political polarisation along ethnic lines has led to a whole segment of society harbouring intense feelings of victimisation, military action can only add to the sense of discrimination—despite Islamabad's claims of ensuring that the army will be completely nondiscriminatory in its actions.

As long as the civilian political government in Sindh continues to be in the hands of a particular group—whose popular mandate is questionable at best—there is ample room for claims of victimisation. This becomes all the more potent when there already exists a history of resentment towards not only the central government amongst the ethnic Sindhis but also the army which was seen as a repressive force especially during the Zia dictatorship. The Prime Minister's reassurance given to the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] leadership regarding its party members can only add to the sense of insecurity and a suspicion that equity and justice will be the least of Islamabad's priorities.

After all, if the whole political process and norms of democracy were compromised continuously over the last few years merely to wipe out the political opposition, it seems less than credible that the same political elite will now observe the rules of fairplay! To use the military in such a situation—when the other dynamics remain constant—is to drag this institution into the sub-national political machinations of the country.

At a time when the military has reasserted its professional identity and when the external threat environment of the country is critical, dragging the army into the political quagmire of Sindh may be a case of severe disservice to the nation. Perhaps the present ruling elite

needs to recall the repercussions of the political intransigence and refusal to abide by democratic norms by the civilian elite in 1971. The amnesia over the Bangladesh crisis could prove to be too heavy a cost for the national polity to sustain.

PDA Summons Assembly

92AS1219B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
3 Jun 92 pp 1, 10

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text] Islamabad, June 2—Having failed in its attempt to continue the budget session of the National Assembly to monitor the ongoing army action in the province of Sindh, the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance]-led Opposition is understood to have decided to file a requisition to summon the Assembly under Section 3 of Article 54 of the Constitution.

The requisition duly signed by one-fourth of the total membership of the House would be submitted to the Speaker of the National Assembly. Under the Constitution, the Speaker will be obliged to summon the session within fourteen days of the receipt of the requisition.

Earlier, a heated discussion took place in the House on the prorogation of the session when the question was raised by PDA members Ch Aitzaz Ahsan, Ch Altaf Hussain and Iftikhar Gillani invited the attention of the Speaker to the government plan to promulgate an ordinance adding a new clause in the CpRC [expansion not given] namely Clause 131 (a) to deal with the situation in Sindh.

The proposed clause is aimed at providing immunity to the members of the armed forces participating in the clean-up operation in the province from any possible legal action.

The PDA members were of the view that instead of inducting the proposed law by an ordinance the Treasury Benches should bring a proper bill in the House and they would willingly cooperate with them in enforcing any law which could help in restoring peace in the troubled province.

Iftikhar Gillani expressing his concern over the Sindh situation said "it was bleeding and we should remain in session to overview the army action." He said that the Opposition Benches were ready to help the government in bringing about reconciliation and peace in the province. The government, he said, should not distort the facts and desist from issuing the proposed ordinance. Instead, a proper bill should be presented in the House to enlist the opinion of the members, he added.

Ch Altaf Hussain of the PDA opposing the ordinance said that it was being issued to punish the people of the province of Sindh.

Speaker Gohar Ayub agreed with the members saying that it was not proper to ignore the Assembly when it was in session and promulgate ordinance only a day after the session was prorogued.

He said that last time the same had happened which should not be repeated now. Law-making through ordinances was a bad practice, the Chair observed.

Law Minister, Ch Ghafoor, opposing the PDA Benches said that no discussion in the House could take place on a step, which was not taken. "We are discussing things which have not happened," he said.

The Speaker told the House that though he had not received the prorogation orders (till 12 pm) and if the House was prorogued, it could meet again to resume its deliberations on the Sindh situation. The Speaker apparently referred to the rights of the members to requisition the House.

The PDA members were supported by Jamaat-e-Islami member Liaqat Baloch who also took the position that if the government wanted a specific piece of legislation, it should place its draft before the National Assembly. He referred to the ruling of the Speaker that ordinances were not good pieces of legislation.

The PDA members also took a strong exception to a statement issued in the name of a spokesman of the President in which the President accused the ousted PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government of not demanding the invocation of Article 147 of the Constitution when it was confronted with a similar situation in the province.

Rising on a point of order, the former Justice Minister of the PPP Government Iftikhar Gilani told the House on a point of order that a number of summaries were sent to the President requesting him to invoke the same article. He said it was a matter of record and the Law Minister should be asked to produce the relevant files of the Ministry in the House.

Iftikhar Gilani pointed out that it was the President himself who once presided over a top-level meeting in the President House on the subject. This meeting was attended by the three Services Chiefs. The Prime Minister and the Law Minister had detailed discussions on the subject with the President. The President along with the then Army Chief insisted on invoking Article 245 of the Constitution instead of Article 147 as according to him it was tantamount to chasing shadows.

Later, addressing a press conference jointly with former Interior Minister Aitzaz Ahsan, the then Chief Minister of Sindh Aftab Shabaan Mirani and former Minister of State for Defence Sarwar Cheema refuted the statement of the spokesman of the President. They termed it as false. They said the PPP Government was opposed to the application of Article 245 and would continue to oppose it.

Deployment Criticized

92AS1219C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
3 Jun 92 p 7

[Article by Humayun Akhtar]

[Text] So, at last the Federal Government has decided to intervene in the law and order problem of Sindh. As long as the late Jam Sadiq Ali ruled Sindh, an impression was given and Islamabad always accepted his words, that all is well in the State of Sindh. However, Allah came to Sindh's rescue, and now the truth, unpalatable as it may be, has come out.

How is it that, immediately after the new incumbent took over as the Chief Minister, that the situation so rapidly deteriorated? Or the earlier pronouncement about the law and order situation made by his late predecessor and authorities in Islamabad were incorrect. The truth is that the law and order situation even then was not normal but was hidden under an iron lid.

Over a week has elapsed since the decision to induct the Army in the affairs of Sindh was announced. The first information concerning the commencement of Army action that came was from the Inter Services Public Relations [ISPR]. It was in the form of a warning to vehicle owners to behave; a job that is the normal responsibility of the Police. This indicated that GHQ [General Headquarters] was in control of the operation. It is but natural, specially when the COAS [Chief of Army Staff], himself has been the Corps Commander of Sindh, during the days when anarchy had prevailed and his knowledge of happenings is much deeper than anybody else.

Wide publicity and a lot of hullabaloo has been made so far about the crackdown, without any apparent concrete action being taken. Thus the element of surprise, that is a pre-requisite in such cases, has been totally lost. Culprits must have taken necessary measures to ensure that they present an image of innocence, whenever the law enforcing agencies start their operation. Arms and ammunition must have been shifted to safe places; dacoits and criminals must have gone into hiding or areas which have so far remained peaceful, like Thatta and Badin. Let us hope that the so much trumpeted army crackdown does not result in a flop, in the same manner as was the fate of the drive for surrendering of illegal arms and does not add to one more failure of the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] Government; however this failure could be disastrous.

Article 147 reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the Government of a Province may, with the consent of the Federal Government, entrust, either conditionally or unconditionally to the Federal Government, or to its officers, function in relations to any matter to which the executive authority of the province extends." This Article is hardly relevant to the deployment of the Armed Forces. It is only Article 245 that refers to the use of the Armed Forces by the Federal

Government. There is no other constitutional provision under which the defence forces can be deployed in a province. Applicability of this clause will, however, mean that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court will stand withdrawn. So what? What is the fear? What are the apprehensions? Even the Federal Government seems confused.

This is not the first time that the Armed Forces will be used in aid to civil power or to restore law and order. The first time, it was in Lahore during the anti-Qadiana riots. Then in 1957, operation 'Close Door' was launched in East Pakistan. Then during Ayub Khan's regime in Karachi, when Gohar Ayub Khan had led the procession of Pathans, after his father's success in elections against Mohtarm Fatima Jinnah. Maximum use of the Armed Forces was made by Mr Bhutto, first during the language riots at Karachi, then in Balochistan, and afterwards when country-wide agitation had taken place against the rigged election. Gen Zia did not lag behind and used the Armed Forces in 1983 to thwart the Movement for Restoration of Democracy.

What is new in what is now happening in Sindh is that all this delay and confusion has been created. The Sindh Chief Minister himself, a lawyer of repute, is unlikely to oppose action under Article 245. Could it be that the GHQ [General Headquarters] is not keen to launch the crackdown? And if so, not under Article 245.

The fact of the matter is that the Army action, if and when launched, is unlikely to produce any positive results. It is on the other hand, likely to have negative fall-out in the form of further widening of the gulf between the people of Pakistan. People of Sindh, in their heart of hearts loath the idea [of] an Army action, because of their fears that such an action will hardly be even-handed in view of their past experiences.

There was a time when the Armed Forces were respected and revered. This scribe is a witness to the scene when the Naval contingents entered Lalukhet during the language riots. They were showered with rose petals and officers were garlanded. There was a sigh of relief among the people. But now?

Nobody in Sindh, including anti-AZO [Al-Zulfikar Organization] elements, give credence to the latest publicised encounter, in which the Navy was the main player. True or fabricated, only Allah and the Navy knows, but the fact is that the way the evidence was produced, is not only lacked credibility but was in a most crude and unnatural form. At this stage, there is no use of going into the gory details of that episode. Suffice to say that it has left most unpleasant and undesired memories for the people of the province. It is human to err but to convert an error into a success is not moral; one day or the other, it is bound to be uncovered. Truth cannot be suppressed for long; that is the law of nature.

Neither the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] nor other political parties are happy about the coming army crackdown. MQM is vocal in their opposition, while the

other parties are playing politics and trying to give an impression as if they support the move. This also puts MQM in a tight corner. The administration has also asked the political parties in the province to let them hand over their "criminal" elements to the law enforcing agencies. This is really an interesting move. Whether they do or they don't, either one of the alternatives will have serious effects on the image of the parties.

The involvement of RAW [Research and Analysis Wing] in Sindh affairs is no secret. Every year, the Indian Budget has a sizeable allocation earmarked for the "well being" of Sindhi language. This hardly needs any further elaboration. One wonders, was it necessary, under the circumstances to blow up the Rajesh Mittal case in the way it has been done. Could it not have been treated in a rather low key? Is a confrontation or giving an excuse to our not so friendly neighbour, now involved in romance with Washington, advisable?

Instead of being a simple, straightforward affair, the game that is being played, intentionally or unintentionally, is getting sinister.

Foreigners Involved

92AS1219D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
3 Jun 92 p 12

[Article by Suleman Raja]

[Text] Karachi, June 2—The federal agencies have gathered concrete proof that some foreign hand was behind the trouble in Sindh.

Highly placed sources while disclosing this to THE MUSLIM, said that the army intelligence and other sensitive agencies of the Federal Government had collected evidence following the arrest of a number of suspects from whom documents of sensitive nature were seized. These documents indicate the involvement of a particular country in the Sindh turmoil.

A number of individuals who were working for these foreign agents had already been netted while a search was on for some others who had gone into hiding.

A senior official of one of the agencies requesting anonymity remarked that certain events which took place in Sindh were aimed at creating chaos and panic amongst the law-abiding citizens.

He added that organised gangs of criminals had been hired to create law and order problems.

He cited the example of kidnapping and looting of bus passengers travelling in the Sindh interior. Most of those who prefer to travel in buses are those who usually belong to the middle class or lower middle class.

The armed men who conduct such operations only get a few thousand rupees by looting them and the manner in which they are organised clearly indicates that their aims were beyond the collection of money at gun-point.

Keeping in view the above evidences the federal agencies have sealed off the Sindh borders and in some parts curfew has been imposed in order to prevent anyone from crossing it illegally.

Raids by the members of different agencies continued in different parts of the Sindh Capital in search of all such anti-state elements.

Meanwhile the operation clean-up in Sindh continued and in the second phase, the army including the civil armed forces plans to conduct raids on the hideouts of criminals.

Most of the kutchra areas on both sides of the river Indus had been cordoned off and operation against the dacoits/kidnappers could be launched anytime. As hardened criminals using these jungles as sanctuaries had been surrounded, there was little hope that they would be able to break the siege.

A plan was also under way to conduct raids in major towns and cities of Sindh in a bid to apprehend the wanted persons and recover huge stocks of illegal arms and ammunition.

DADU Staffer adds:

The army, with the help of local police, mounted an anti-dacoit operation in the hilly tracts of Amri, according to information reaching here.

The law-enforcing agencies exchanged fire with the dacoits but no loss of life was reported.

The Amri jungle has also been encircled and a portion of woods has been put on fire to flush out the dacoits.

Meanwhile, the District Magistrate, Dadu has imposed curfew in the Dadu District bordering Balochistan to check any attempt by the dacoits to flee into the neighbouring province.

Corps Commander Lt Gen "Nasir Akhtar, meanwhile, reached Dadu by helicopter Tuesday and exchanged views with the army officers on the on-going operation in the area.

Second Phase

92AS1219E Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
4 Jun 92 pp 1, 12

[Article by Suleman Raja]

[Text] Karachi, June 3—The second phase of operation clean up Wednesday began in the volatile province of Sindh with the members of the civil armed forces including army jawans and Mehran Rangers thrusting their way into the rough terrain and deep jungles to wipe out the terrorists, outlaws and other hardened criminals.

Reports of heavy encounters, recovery of kidnapped persons also poured in from the Sindh interior, particularly from the dacoit infested area of Dadu.

The heavily armed members of the law enforcing agencies, assisted by the commandos, launched their first major offensive on Tuesday in Dadu and some other adjoining areas and till the filing of this report, the onslaught was underway.

Senior officials of the army, who have acquired special training in such warfares, were personally supervising the operation against these hardened criminals who are now on the run.

They have adopted most modern anti-dacoit techniques to wipe out these criminals who have made these jungles and rough terrain including kutchra areas their hideouts.

The Corps Commander, Lt Gen Nasir Akhtar also flew in to the affected parts what could now be called as the battle front where he was briefed about the action.

The Corps Commander after the briefing also gave on the spot directives to the concerned officials in order to make the operation a complete success.

Though the bandits are armed with most sophisticated weapons, it seems that they stand little chance against the trained commandos and other experts who are there to challenge them.

One of the major moves of the operation clean up officials, is that they have set on fire some parts of the forest in a bid to bring the dacoits in the open or in those areas where they want them to be.

Some resistance during the onslaught was also reported but most of it was crushed within no time.

During the operation, 32 bus passengers who were kidnapped by dacoits on May 30, were also recovered by the members of the civil armed forces. They were recovered from the Adhri forest and were found chained.

It may be mentioned that 40 bus passengers were kidnapped by the dacoits belonging to the gang of Imam Khoso in Amri area.

The safe recovery of 32 kidnapped persons was one of the major achievements made by the members of the law enforcing agencies conducting the operation.

Reports of encounters and arrests also poured in from the Sindh interior but the official quarters were quiet over the matter and said that they would be giving the details at a later stage.

A senior official of one of the agencies, talking to THE MUSLIM, said that after the completion of phase I, the second phase begins and this is where the action starts.

He said "during phase one we had stationed our men at different vital points and had sealed off the escape routes.

The Mehran Rangers, as mentioned earlier by THE MUSLIM, were playing a key role in the operation, they were however being assisted by army jawans and commandos.

Amnesty Report Editorialized

92AS1219F Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
4 Jun 92 p 6

[Editorial: "Amnesty Makes Embarrassing Revelations of Abuses"] txt

[Text] The IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] government has been accused by the human rights organisation, Amnesty International (AI) of "relentlessly harassing" its opponents in Sindh through mass police round ups, series of detentions and widespread torture including rape. The AI report released Monday said it had collected names of 600 members of opposition parties arrested since the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government some two years ago—although the total number of arrests was believed to be in thousands. As far as AI is aware, none of the 600 has been convicted of any offence, and in fact, many have been repeatedly acquitted, says the report. "The first wave of arrests took place just weeks after the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] government was dismissed—and the leaders and rank and file members of opposition parties have been targeted for arrest ever since, AI said. The most recent mass arrests took place in May this year, with some 1,000 PPP members picked up as they intended to stage a protest rally against rigging in the Sanghar by-election. The AI report says PPP and members of other opposition parties had been arrested and even abducted, in the run up to elections, a reasonable assumption can be that this was done to stop them from campaigning.

Thousands of others have been picked up in the wake of violent events in Sindh. The government has accused PPP of being responsible for these without bothering to produce the slightest evidence. After the murder of a judge in June 1991, several hundred PPP members were arrested, with a further 2,500 people reportedly picked up the following week in a sweeping search for the murderers. Most of them were released shortly afterwards, the report adds. The AI report says many political workers have been held in secret detention, in some cases, they have been shifted from one police station to another to make it difficult for their families to trace them. Fresh criminal charges were slapped on prisoners the moment they were acquitted of a previous set of charges, thus prolonging their detention for many months. The report even lists some specific cases. There are also disturbing reports of prisoners being beaten and otherwise tortured, to say nothing of their being administered electric shocks. Women prisoners detained on political grounds, the AI report continues, have been raped in police custody.

The AI report makes a gruesome read. It is enough to shake confidence in human nature, which can evidently go to the depths of degradation in order to harass its

opponents. Where Pakistani society is concerned, apparently there is no tolerance whatsoever for dissent. The idea being that if they do not come in line just terrorise them and their kith and kin into abject submission. Pakistani politicians have found the timing of the report strange as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is shortly due in London on an official visit at the invitation of British Prime Minister John Major. The report will certainly weaken his position because liberals will hound him everywhere. That, of course, is his problem. All we can do is wait and see how he handles the situation.

The matter does not end here. The question is where do we go from here. Thousands of Pakistani citizens have been mistreated in the most cynical manner by the state apparatus and patently on the express instructions of the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] government in the province of Sindh. Can the Prime Minister distance himself from this horror-ridden record? Or, can the President, who has all along taken a special interest, and continues to do so in a pretty explicit manner as far as the administration in Sindh is concerned? How are injustice done and cruelty inflicted to be duly redressed? The dreaded Jam Sadiq Ali, author of this shameful chapter in our history, is dead. But his lieutenants and collaborators are around. Is there no legal remedy for the victims of what turns out to be Hitlerite fascism. We have no doubt seen dark days of obscurantist dictatorship and violence against human dignity but nothing quite so irredeemably brutal as let loose by the Jam regime. And providence knows he was not alone. His partners in crime can and ought to be dealt with and justice done to the wretched victims of their terror. Justice must be done, though the heavens fall.

Article Views Limitations of Sindh Operation

92AS1252B AKHBAR-E-JEHAN in Urdu
22 Jun 92 p 13

[Article by Mahmood Sham under byline, "From Karachi Skies": "Who Will Decide Whether the Sindh Operation Has Achieved its Goals? Self-Policing Has Restored the Army's Prestige to a Certain Extent, But...."]

[Text] Sindh is at present passing through strange times.

The army is in Sindh under Article 147 of the constitution to help the civil administration.

Conditions today are very different from what they were in 1971 or 1975 when the army was sent into East Pakistan and Balochistan; the intention then also was to help the civil administration. Today, however, compared to those times, the media of communication have undergone a revolutionary change. The poor and innocent peasants of Tandu Bahawal were depicted in the press and television as terrorists. Today, if the media of communication were not free and courageous, these poor peasants would have been buried in the pages of history as terrorists. But Sindhi newspapers showed courage; English newspapers fulfilled their duty and

displayed a sense of history; an army officer took a personal interest in the matter and consequently the dark shadow that might have fallen on the reputation of the army was dispelled. The army demonstrated the ability to regulate itself. The chief minister of Sindh announced in the Sindh assembly that the nine individuals killed were not terrorists. As a result of this historical mistake, the army has made changes throughout its command and thus established a new and surprising precedent in the history of Pakistan and its army. In its operations, the army has never before openly admitted making a mistake as it has done now nor has it ever taken any action against its officers. Undoubtedly, what the army has now done will restore its declining prestige and the people will be reassured that the army will not again become involved in such actions and that a system exists within the army for automatically bringing to account officers who act wrongfully and disobey unambiguous orders. At the same time, however, the incident confirms some past fears about army operations in East Pakistan and Balochistan. The press then was under restrictions and it was never revealed whether any action was taken regarding the incidents reported in the foreign press. During those prolonged operations no one knows how many Tandu Bahavels were buried in the dust of censorship.

The fact is that such incidents have proved injurious to the Sindh operation and hurt the army's prestige. The army command may have been reshuffled and legal action taken against the major involved in the incident; but those mothers who lost their sons, sisters who lost their brothers, wives their husbands and fathers the support of their old age, they will find no solace in Article 147 nor will a compensation of 300,000 rupees restore a lost son to a mother.

Punishing the guilty major will not restore the prestige of the armed forces nor will it solve the Sindh problem. The Tandu Bahaval tragedy is not the outcome of one individual's mistake but the result of today's greed for money and a peculiar mentality and behaviour. The lust for accumulating as much wealth as possible; for usurping other people's lands by illegal means; the illegitimate use of power, influence, and contacts have become epidemic in society. The civilian bureaucracy, elected representatives, ministers and other influential people have all become infected with the disease. Influential individuals allot government land to their own people at the price of peanuts and no records are kept nor any accounting given. This is happening all over, in Hyderabad, Karachi, and the interior of Sindh; influential people both in the urban and rural areas are helping themselves to the bargains. The entire society is participating in the rush for wealth. The tragedy in Tandu Bahaval occurred in an attempt to steal land, and influential people, the police, and an army officer were involved in it. It shows to what an extent the disease of using illegal means to make money has spread when individuals belonging to an organized force such as the army are used for these black-market transactions and

their uniform and power are put to such use. When innocent people were depicted as terrorists to justify their assassination, no police or army officer or elected representative took the trouble to enquire into the incident and verify the accusation. Our journalists are usually criticized for printing stories without verification. In this instance, even a highly placed individual such as the prime minister did not bother to investigate whether the nine Pakistanis who were killed were indeed terrorists, whether the weapons found in their possession belonged to them or came from somewhere else. Now that journalists have brought this massacre to light, a hideous side of society has come into view, which shows that we have fallen so low that we do not hesitate to kill even humans to satisfy our craving for money or to involve an organization like the army in our schemes. This crime was not committed by one individual alone; it shows the hollowness of our society and reveals the mentality of the majority of our people who want to become rich overnight. This is a large-scale looting of government lands and misuse of government powers by influential individuals. It is necessary to mount an operation against this mentality. The mentality of a government official, an army officer was revealed, but a large number of other individuals are still engaged in similar activities. The army should undertake its own investigation and the government should take appropriate measures. God alone knows how many innocent lives are being sacrificed to the business of land [grabbing].

Yousuf Jakharani was a courageous political worker, a political leader who had no personal ax to grind; his name came to the forefront during the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] movement. We met him several times; he supported federation; wanted rights for Sindh within the framework of Pakistan; he tried so hard and put forth so much effort. We met him often at Sherbaz Mazari's house. He was one of those spirited Sindhi leaders who had sustained [political] wounds, but had remained free of separatist bias. He was the leader of NDP [National Democratic Party] Sindh and later had ties to Jai Sindh as well. He belonged to the circle of friends of G.M. Sayed, Sindh's aging leader. It is inconceivable to think that he would abandon democratic struggle and political efforts to achieve Sindh's rights, and instead become a patron of bandits. He did not even think on those lines; that was not part of his mentality or his behaviour. It was astounding to see him arrested for patronizing thieves; it was even more astounding to hear of his death in prison. A man who had seen the inside of so many jails, who had suffered so many hardships for democracy would never have been afraid of arrest and imprisonment.

The armed forces should get to the bottom of this incident because Yousuf Jakharani was arrested at the behest of a minister of the region who was afraid of him politically and was also a business rival. An investigation will undoubtedly reveal that in this incident as well, the Sindh operation was used for personal objectives. A minister selected for office contrary to the wishes of the

people used his powers wrongfully; gave false information to those enforcing the law, and made them arrest his personal rival under pretext of the Sindh operation.

Yousuf Jakharani struggled in the hope of a new dawn, not just for the inhabitants of Sindh but for all the suffering people of Pakistan. He was not an extremist. Such conspiracies have been seen in Pakistan in the past as well when individuals working for federation, for the unity of Pakistan have been put under such pressure that they have turned into extremists. Moderates met death mysteriously, forcing other moderates to change their behaviour. When moderate leaders such as Yousuf Jakharani meet death in mysterious circumstances, extremists get the opportunity to incite young people and to tell them, "See what the federal people have done to him; see how the army has killed him; abandon talk of federation; talk about Sindh; about the province."

These are sensitive issues that the federal government and the armed forces should take into account and handle correctly. Whatever the members of the federal government or the provincial government may have to say, the army should trust its own sources and arrest individuals on basis of those reports. If the [Sindh] operation should become a means of satisfying the wishes of federal or provincial ministers and settling their political scores, no change will take place in the situation. Law and order will continue to remain in a disturbed state; bandits will proliferate and criminals will find patrons.

The military operation in Sindh is a final and sensitive test and caution should be used at every step because it is the measure of last resort and no other recourse will be left. If in the next six months this operation does not completely eradicate banditry in Sindh, establish law and order and improve the situation, all confidence will be lost in the power of the army and its effectiveness.

A military operation carried out in one's own cities and against one's own people is more delicate and dangerous than war against an enemy.

The people of Karachi and the interior of Sindh are expressing surprise and asking how can an operation be carried out impartially when the provincial government, which was unable to fulfill its duty of restoring law and order and asked for the army to carry out the operation, still remains in office. Wouldn't the government use its influence [in its own favor]?

The situation is being debated in the Sindh assembly and by the time you read these lines, the details of the debate will have been made public. Pir Pagara, Sindh's prominent political figure, is again making predictions and by the time you read these words you will have found out if what he predicted this time has come to pass.

The unanimity of opinion needed for the Sindh operation has not materialized and tension and confrontation seem to be increasing. Whether at this time the federal

government or the provincial government comes forward, a forum is urgently needed in which the representatives of political parties, social organizations, and groups can come together and in a loud voice lay down certain limits to the operation. Attention should be paid to the social, political, and welfare measures proposed by the chief of army staff for the people of Sind. It is also necessary to decide on a way to ascertain that the aims of the operation have been achieved and thus the army's help is no longer needed by the civil administration.

Situation in Sindh Viewed, Analyzed

92ASI252 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 25 Jun 92 p 5

[Editorial: "The Situation in Sindh"]

[Text] The operations carried out in Sindh against terrorists and bandits and the results emerging from the action undertaken by the army against MQM [Muhajir Quami Movement] in Karachi raise fears of an impending political storm in the country. It cannot be denied that members of other political parties were also involved in terrorism and criminal activities and certain parties are notorious for such deeds. Many efforts have been made in the past to establish a connection between Al-Zulfikar and the People's Party and some parties and organizations have been accused of separatist tendencies. There is truth to a large extent in these accusations; other parties also may have torture chambers and if the army were to undertake an operation against them, it might uncover large caches of weapons and other material. All these other parties belong to the opposition whereas MQM supported Nawaz Sharif and the ruling party. The prime minister's relations with Altaf Hussain were not just pleasant and friendly but brotherly. They trusted each other to such a degree that in certain matters the prime minister preferred MQM to the member parties of IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad]. The facts, which came to light in the army operation against MQM, were hinted at in the past and Nawaz Sharif had full knowledge of them. The fact that no action was taken against MQM and it was allowed to remain in the government indicates clearly that the prime minister was influenced by certain considerations and political pressures. His course of action undoubtedly helped him to maintain and strengthen his power but from the point of view of national interests, his policy cannot be called commendable. It is not right to deliberately ignore the fate of the people for the sake of personal power and political considerations. Judging from the way things are progressing, it appears that the opposition will soon prepare a charge sheet against the prime minister and will try to show that the government was an equal partner with MQM in its criminal activities and therefore should resign. If in any other democratic country, a party participating in the government had been found to have committed serious crimes, the prime minister would have accepted all responsibility and resigned. But no such tradition exists in Pakistan and no possibility exists of the government accepting responsibility and resigning. Sayed Muzaffar Hussain, the chief minister of

Sindh, is a serious, moderate, and decent person and he is not in a position to take a strong stand in the matter. Therefore, the assembly can be dissolved in Sindh at any time and governor's rule established. But such a measure would not please the opposition especially the People's Party, which can nevertheless demand the dismissal of the federal government. Such a situation would not be to the advantage of democracy in the country.

A confrontation between the government and the opposition would allow a third force to come forward irrespective of its nature; thus, in order to preserve democracy and political activity in the country, the president may have to resort to constitutional measures. The next few days will reveal the direction of the crisis in Sindh and show how far the storm will spread. Political wisdom as well as sympathy for the people of Sindh demand that the prime minister travel to Karachi to observe the situation at first hand and make decisions accordingly. After the Jameswarou tragedy, it is necessary that the prime minister go to Sindh and extend to the innocent victims personally the paternal gesture of consolation and support.

Motivation Behind Sindh Operation Examined

92AS1253A Karachi TAKBEER in Urdu 9 Jul 92 pp 5-7

[Editorial: "Military Operation in Sindh: Issues Requiring Attention"]

[Text] Ten days ago, on 19 June, a campaign was started in Karachi against terrorists and subversives and this operation has been gradually widened to include other urban areas of Hyderabad and Sindh. During these 10 days, several issues have come to the forefront that need to be brought to the attention of those in charge because if these issues are not resolved, the results of the operation, instead of having a positive effect on the national interests, will be negative, diffuse, and severely harmful.

The point to be noted first of all is that up to now, the antiterrorist operation inside cities and against political parties has been in practice directed against the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] alone; however, it is an obvious fact that terrorists are not harbored only by MQM; various other linguistic, regional, sectarian, ideological, group, and political organizations have special arrangements for sheltering terrorists. Some organizations have branches set up for terrorism and subversion the most famous of which is Al-Zulfiqar. Various Sindhi nationalist organizations have similar recognizable identities. Obvious clues point to these organizations as being responsible for several incidents of pointless shootings in the province in which dozens of people were killed each time. Several parties formed on religious sectarian lines should also be included in the list of such organizations. According to reports entered in various police stations, several prominent members of the MQM rebel faction who call themselves the True MQM and have become an instrument of revolt against Altaf Hussain, were involved in terrorist incidents and hence should have

been arrested. But the 10-day operation conveys the clear impression that the True MQM has the full protection of authorities supervising the operation. Several members of the True MQM who are wanted for various crimes move about freely carrying illegal weapons and do not appear to fear arrest. As far as the possession of illegal weapons is concerned, the members of hardly any political group can be considered innocent of the crime; these weapons are openly displayed in their meetings and gatherings and their student organizations are conducting major campaigns in educational institutions with the help of these illegal weapons.

In view of these facts, keeping the operation limited to MQM even after 10 days is creating anxiety among the people and, in public circles everywhere, the view is being expressed that perhaps the aim of this operation is not to end terrorism but to crush MQM. Such an impression is a dangerous one; if the operation is not widened, and if instead of targeting only the MQM Altaf group, it is not directed, irrespective of party and group affiliations, against all terrorists, the oppressor will soon endeavor to portray itself to the people as the oppressed and try once again to attract public sympathy. A stronger tide of linguistic and provincial prejudices will wash away the efforts to promote national identity.

Another matter that we would like to bring to the attention of those in charge of the operation is that up to now, their arrangements to bring facts obtained through investigation to the attention of the people have been defective and this shortcoming has made the work of those trying to discredit the operation very easy. What should have been done is that individuals who were arrested and questioned should have been brought before the public with the cooperation of the media of communication. The verbatim confessions and disclosures made by these individuals and the details of the crimes in which they were involved should have been made public. What is surprising is that not a single one of the many individuals arrested over the last 10 days has been presented to the public and the media as a self-confessed criminal. This secretive policy of hiding facts is conveying the impression among the public that innocent people are being arrested and that those conducting the operation have been unable to obtain any information which they can present to the people and strengthen their confidence in the campaign. We think that this unnecessarily secretive policy should be abandoned and the people should be informed at once of all the information gathered. Information that could prove harmful to the country's interests if divulged should be kept secret but this policy of total black out should certainly be ended.

Similarly, individuals who have been directly or indirectly affected by terrorist activity should be presented on the media, especially television, and the people should learn details of the wrongs these individuals have suffered and the identities of those responsible for their sufferings. An obstacle to such a procedure is the sense of insecurity that exists among the people and that this

operation has not been able to dispel; they are still in the grip of fear and trepidation and do not believe that the operation will get rid of inhuman criminals so thoroughly that after the army leaves, the criminals will not be able to make them targets of their vengeance. Hence, the people are not willing to identify themselves, to have their accounts published in the press, or to appear on television. In order to restore confidence among these terrified people, it is necessary to punish, as specified by the law, the murderers, terrorists, and all others responsible for inflicting inhuman cruelties on helpless victims in torture chambers. Illegal weapons should be recovered as far as possible and a firm assurance should be given that law and order will continue after the operation so much so that it will be impossible for anyone to use illegal weapons or for any individual or organization to even think of building torture cells.

During the 10 days of the operation, on the one hand, all efforts of the leaders of the MQM Altaf group to reportedly flee the country were assiduously thwarted, whereas, on the other hand, Irfanullah Murawat, the unelected advisor to the chief minister of Sindh, who was reportedly wanted in connection with various criminal activities including the Jameswarou tragedy, surfaced in London. Reports are also circulating about the departure from the country of two members of the provincial assembly connected with Sindh's interior who are also believed to be wanted in connection with the Jameswarou tragedy and were forbidden to leave the country. These reports strengthen the belief that the operation is being conducted against the MQM alone, otherwise how could individuals wanted for various criminal activities have foiled the strict security arrangements in force in the two provinces and left the country? Irfanullah Murawat is the president's son-in-law and his successful arrival in London at this juncture bears a logical relationship to the president's powers. This impression would be proved wrong only if Murawat is returned to Pakistan as soon as possible and brought before the institutions who wish to question him about the incidents. It is also necessary that individuals who are on the list [of those wanted for questioning] should not be allowed to leave the country, no matter which party they belong to and what position they hold. The names of those officials and government employees who helped [the wanted] individuals flee the country should be made public and legal steps taken against them without delay.

In our view, these are the aspects of the operation that have thrown its impartiality into doubt. As long as the operation is not widened to include everyone and all terrorists irrespective of their group affiliations; as long as facts obtained through investigation are not placed before the public and the people given total assurance of the complete and permanent end of the terrorists so as to create a sense of confidence and security among them, this operation will not succeed in restoring law and order, in ending prejudice, promoting national thinking, rebuilding industry and launching an era of national prosperity. Such positive results will not only not be

achieved, but the way will be opened to the oppressors to portray themselves as the oppressed and mislead the people.

We will now examine another aspect of the operation. Soon after the operation started, details started to emerge about the MQM's cruelties, the torture chambers and the atrocious acts performed there; these reports appeared in both the national and international media of communication and raised the following question: since MQM was a supporter of the Nawaz Sharif government and a participant with it in both the federal and provincial governments, was one to understand that even though the Nawaz Sharif government knew of MQM's terrorist and fascist activities, it continued its partnership with MQM; in other words, would it not be true to say that Pakistan was ruled by terrorists? What was even worse, right at the time when the operation was at its height, the prime minister, the federal minister of the interior, and other responsible government officials made statements expressing full support for MQM and Altaf Hussain and assured them that the Nawaz Sharif government would remain their friend through thick and thin. This is not the way the matter should have been handled. Following revelations that this organization, which had the documented support of the people, was a terrorist one, the government, which up to that time had relations of friendship and cooperation with this organization [MQM], should have at once announced the end of this relationship. However, because of certain unknown considerations, such an action was not taken with the result that MQM members of the national and provincial assemblies got the opportunity of metaphorically flinging their resignations in the face of the government and conveying the impression that they had thus created problems for it. If the dissenting members of the PDA in the province should withdraw their support from the Muzaffar government, it will undoubtedly fall. It is also possible that in order to stay in office, Muzaffar Hussain Shah may seek the cooperation of the PDA, and failing that and if the assembly is not dissolved, the PDA may be in the position of forming a government; Qaim Ali Shah is being mentioned as the leader of such a PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] government.

In our view, all these are circumstances that would make it impossible for the antiterrorist operation to continue without hindrance and with lack of prejudice. Every political group participating in the government will try to protect its terrorists from the purging operation by creating obstacles. If the PDA should cooperate with the government or dominate it, any action against Al-Zulfiqar will become impossible. Sindhi nationalist organizations will also try to protect their own people from the purge; thus, in our view, the only solution is to end political government for a certain period in the province and impose governor's rule. The army should be given the powers specified in Article 245 of the constitution, which will fully protect it from political pressure; it should be allowed total freedom, not just to crush any particular group, but to end all terrorist activity irrespective of its connection with any group or organization.

After the task is accomplished, elections should be held at all levels and the province provided with a political leadership completely free of the taint of pursuing the politics of bias and of harboring criminals and terrorists. In order to achieve this objective, Articles 62 and 63 of the constitution laying down the eligibility requirements for running for parliament should be rigorously enforced and the election commission should reject the nomination papers of any candidate who does not meet the specified terms.

The voters also bear an important responsibility; they should not knowingly elect representatives whose dishonesty is obvious. However, the tide of prejudice in Karachi and Hyderabad became so strong after 1986 that voters ignored the fact that a good character and clean record were essential requirements in a delegate. In the 1990 elections in particular, it was quite clear that both the MQM and the People's Party were terrorist organizations. During Benazir's term of office, both parties abducted each other's members who were then returned through the efforts of General Asif Nawaz who was the corps commander here. Everyone knows in what condition these individuals were found; both parties had inflicted the worst kind of violence on these men in their torture chambers. The terrible and novel torture of using drill machines to make holes in human bodies was introduced during these incidents. Nevertheless, a heavy majority of the people in urban and rural areas voted for the MQM and People's Party and sent their members as delegates to the provincial and federal assemblies. These facts render pointless the complaint commonly heard nowadays among political circles opposed to the MQM who ask why, since the government was fully acquainted with the terrorist activities of the MQM, no steps were taken against that organization. Government circles would be justified in answering that although the MQM was terrorist, it represented a large majority of the people and it enjoyed extraordinary popularity in Karachi and Hyderabad; as many as 2 million people participated in MQM gatherings. If any steps had been taken against the organization when it was at the height of its popularity, not only would such action have lacked public support but rebellion against the government might have broken out in the urban areas of Sindh; clashes might have occurred between armed troops and civilians resulting in great bloodshed and an unsurmountable gulf of hatred would have been created between the army and the people. Powerful forces inimical to Pakistan who dream of dividing it up

into pieces would have benefited. Those who wish to make Karachi into a free state like Hong Kong and the province of Sindh into Sindhu Desh would have found favorable conditions for carrying out their plans. The integrity and safety of Pakistan would not have benefited in any way. Thus, the government had to wait for a suitable time to take action; and when it became clear and signs emerged showing that a significant majority of the people no longer regarded terrorists as the guardians of their interests but saw them as mere terrorists from whom they wished to be protected, the government decided to go ahead with the operation. In our view, this is a position the importance of which cannot be overlooked. The responsibility for the reign of terror in Karachi and other cities of Sindh undoubtedly rests largely on those voters who elected this organization, which was founded solely on the basis of prejudice and was openly fascist in character. It is thus not fair to blame the government alone for the reign of terror and the sufferings of the people. The government tried its best to work with the delegates who were sent to the assemblies by the voters; however, when the delegates made life so unbearable for their own people as to raise an outcry, the government took action against these representatives.

Next to the voters, the election commission is in our view responsible for the situation. Pakistan's constitution lays down eligibility requirements for candidates running for elected office and the electoral laws forbid the use of language, area, affiliation, creed, etc. as the basis for soliciting votes. We think that it is the duty of the election commission to abide by these regulations and prevent parties and individuals who do not conform to them from taking part in the elections. Not to do so renders the regulations meaningless and void and this is a matter that cannot be easily dismissed. Ignoring the regulations gives individuals and organizations who have no interest in preserving the integrity of the country or in promoting the progress and prosperity of the nation the power to toy with the destiny of the country.

We hope that in the future, whenever the people of Pakistan, especially the urban and rural inhabitants of Sindh, participate in elections, they will remember this experience and cast their votes only for such individuals in whose integrity, conscientiousness, capability, and character they have complete faith. The election commission should also consider it its duty to bar from participation in the elections any party or candidate who does not meet all the eligibility requirements laid down in the constitution.

Sharif Asked To Make Koran, Sunnah Supreme Laws

92AS1263F Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Jul 92 p 4

[Text] Islamabad, July 8—The “Nifaz-e-Shariah Working Committee” on Wednesday made fervent appeal to the Prime Minister to make “Quran and Sunnah” being the supreme law as part of the constitution as no further consultation was required after verdict of the Federal Shariat Court in this regard.

The 23-member Shariah Working Committee, set up by Prime Minister Mohammad Naraz Sharif, met here Wednesday under the Chairmanship of the Federal Religious Minister Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi.

The Committee approved a number of recommendations to step up the Islamisation process. It called upon the Government to initiate measures for implementation of the recommendations submitted by the Islamic Ideological Council. It suggested that a Committee comprising Chairman Islamic Ideological Council and Federal Religious Minister might meet the Federal Law Minister to ponder over the steps necessary for implementation of the recommendations.

The number of the Shariah Committee unanimously demanded that its recommendations should be directly sent to the Prime Minister so that the federal cabinet could consider the requisite measures for their enforcement.

The Committee proposed to revive “Nizam-e-Salat” and called for practical steps for the enforcement of the cardinal article of Islam.

The Shariah Committee was of the view that the prayers’ time should be same in all the cities of the country and business centres should be closed at the prayer time.

In its recommendations, the committee said that the system of Zakat and Usher be enforced strictly in accordance with Islamic injunctions. The money collected should be distributed only to the needy.

The Committee proposed that its recommendations on economic system and on education be sent to the commission on Islamic economy and to the commission on Islamic education. The members said that it was necessary so that both commissions could benefit from the recommendations.

Earlier, Maulana Niazi in his opening remarks told the members of the Shariah Committee which included MNAs [Member of National Assembly] and Ulema of various hues that the Prime Minister in his recent meeting asked him to accelerate the efforts for enforcement of Islamic system. He told them that if the members of the committees were assertive and committed, their efforts for the introduction of Islamic system would not go [to] waste. However, he urged them to provide the government with a comprehensive and viable alternate economic system based on Islamic injunctions as only then the onus would rest on the government to enforce it. He said, so far an alternate system had not been provided to the government. Maulana Niazi said, he was in the government only to introduce Islam in the country and would continue his endeavours for it.

The Federal Religious Minister said he had already proposed to the Prime Minister to constitute the committees of the concerned ministries so that the recommendations of the three committees set up for the Islamisation could be discussed and finalised for the implementation.—APP

Commerce Minister Trade Policy Speech Presented*92AS1242C Karachi DAWN in English 1 Jul 92 p 6***[Outline as published]**

[Text] Islamabad, June 30—The following is the text of the speech by Malik Naeem Khan, Minister for Commerce, announcing the Trade Policy, 1992-93:

It is a great privilege for me to present the second Trade Policy of the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] Government. We are all the time conscious of the fact that the nation entrusted us with the responsibility of managing the affairs of the country with a mandate to usher in an era of prosperity and well-being. Thus all the policies of our Government including the Trade Policy which I am announcing today are links in the chain of efforts aimed to make our beloved country Pakistan prosperous and strong.

But we seek to achieve the "prosperity and real strength" which means that the quest of economic growth and development does not in any way compromise national honour and self-respect.

2. Cognizant of this over-riding imperative, the Government of IJI headed by Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif adopted "Self Reliance" as the prime national objective.

The Government also chose Liberalisation, Deregulation and Privatisation as key policy instruments, designed to remove obstacles from the path of development, correct distortions in allocation of resources and release the stupendous energies of the private sector.

The Trade Policy for 1991-92 and the Trade Policy for the coming fiscal year have been conceived on these conceptual foundations.

3. Given our firm commitment to self reliance, given the manifest need to accelerate the process of development, without adding to the crushing burden of debts payable by generation after generation, we deem it absolutely essential, to develop the capacity to pay for our ever-increasing import requirements from own resources, instead of looking for charity and assistance from others. This calls for adoption and pursuit of dynamic policies of export promotion. In our circumstances export led growth is not something merely desirable, it is absolutely critical.

4. In order to achieve a sustained rate of growth in exports we have to continuously:

- Increase our productive capacity.
- Improve productivity.
- Manufacture a progressively expanding range of products of international quality at competitive prices.
- Strive for higher and higher value addition.

—Embark upon an intensive and aggressive marketing campaign.

5. To this end, our policies are mainly focused and our efforts are primarily directed.

I would like to state an obvious fact here: The task of the government is not to engage in trade but to provide a supportive policy framework and operational environment which promote, assist, accelerate and potentiate the efforts of the private sector.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

6. Much has been accomplished during the past one and a half year. The government has been making incessant efforts to address structural problems which have over the decades held Pakistan back in playing its proper role in world markets. The inward looking, unimaginative policies and an overly regulated operational environment eroded Pakistan's initial advantageous position viz-a-viz its immediate competitors in the international markets, some of which are now categorized as NICs [Newly Industrialized Countries]. It would be pertinent, here, to note that in the late 60s, Pakistan's manufactured exports exceeded the combined exports of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. Now each of these countries is far ahead of Pakistan.

I would like to assure you that the government has been trying to recapture lost momentum and help our exporting sector to regain the competitive edge by providing highly congenial policy environment and extending all possible assistance and promotional support at the operational level.

7. Needless to say, however, all impediments cannot be overcome, all problems cannot be resolved and total transformation of the productive spectrum cannot be brought about with one stroke.

As a matter of fact, there is usually a possibility, that we may not achieve our export targets or reduce imbalance of trade in the short run.

Liberalisation of trade in the first instance tends to widen the adverse external balance. This occurs due to the time lag between the generation of output for export in the future and import machinery in the present. The important thing is the direction of the policy and willingness of the private sector to take full advantage of it. The process of export expansion is a continuous one, requiring unremitting efforts on the part of the Government and the private sector, over a period of several years both at the economy wide and narrower policy and institutional levels.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

8. There is a clear need for bringing about structural change in the composition of the export package.

Still about 70 per cent of our export earnings are derived from rice and cotton or its manufactures. Further, half of our exports are destined for only six countries.

In this Trade Policy we have accorded priority attention to boosting exports of non-traditional items as well as diversifying our markets. These non-traditional items represent a dynamic element having an immense scope for growth. The government will help you in all possible ways—from better manufacture to aggressive marketing for promoting exports of non-traditional items.

9. The increase in per unit value of exports is also imperative. It is in no way less important to the increase in overall quantum of exports. In respect of textile products subject to quota, Trade Policy structural support for increasing the per unit value of exports is being further enhanced and strengthened.

10. May I now turn briefly to the import regime. Import Policy aims to achieve sustained economic growth through stimulation and acceleration of industrial development with special emphasis on export oriented industrialisation.

11. We have opted to pursue path of liberalisation of imports which has been chosen after a great deal of deliberation and in view of the long experience of developing countries which have performed well in the sphere of exports. Protection to indigenous industry is now given through tariffs rather than non-tariff measures like bans, restrictions on source or quantitative limitations.

The shift from non-tariff to tariffs as the main policy instrument of policy has also enhanced transparency of the import regime. We have continued the process of liberalisation in this policy.

12. I would like now to refer to the performance of the international trade of Pakistan during the current fiscal year (1991-92).

This has to be viewed against the backdrop of the prevalent world trade environment. The last calendar year was the third consecutive year of decelerating growth in the volume of world output and trade.

Growth in the world trade volume slowed to 3 percent in 1991 from 5 percent in 1990 representing the minimum increment since 1983. The dollar value of world merchandise exports rose by 1.5 percent to \$3.53 trillion last year, the slowest growth since 1985.

Particularly the all pervasive recession in North America and slowdown of the economic expansion in Western Europe coupled with lower prices for a number of primary commodities, acted as brakes on our export growth and earnings.

13. Despite the adverse external environment, exports in the eleven months of the current year, have touched the level US\$6,140 million registering a growth rate of 14

percent. We expect to end the year with a growth rate of nearly 15 percent and export earnings reaching a level of US\$7 billion.

This export performance, in view of slow down of economics of our trading partners, should be considered satisfactory and reasonable although it is below the target fixed at the beginning of the year. We could have achieved our target to a far greater extent had there not been a crash in prices of cotton and a reduction in prices of rice.

14. The textile products like cotton cloth, hosiery, ready-made garments, cotton makeups including bed wear and towels have registered a growth rate of 18 percent. However, there has been a decline of 7 percent in export earnings from yarn.

15. Leather products, synthetic textiles, sports goods and surgical instruments and other miscellaneous products registered positive growth.

16. There has been a sizeable fall in the average unit price of both rice and cotton. However, in value terms the exports of rice registered an increase of 25 percent and cotton 51 percent.

The production of cotton in the country increased from 9.6 million bales in 1990-91 to almost 13 million bales in 1991-92 surpassing all previous records.

Although the mill demand remained firm, but the huge size of the crop and recession in the major economies of the world had a depressing effect on domestic prices.

Acting on a directive from the Prime Minister, the Cotton Export Corporation launched a massive purchase operation and was successful in rescuing the farmers as well as the ginners from an otherwise difficult situation.

17. Exports of tents and canvas, tanned leather, fruits and vegetables showed a declining trend.

18. Import bill in the first eleven months of the year was US\$8,399 million which represented an increase of 20 percent as compared to last year. By the end of the current financial year our over-all import bill is expected to be US\$9,200 million.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

19. On the import side the steep increase at the first glance appears to be an undesirable development, as it widened the gap in the balance of trade.

However, on a closer look you will find that this increase in the import bill is due to substantial increase in the import of capital machinery which at US\$2,299 million is 59 percent more in the eleven months period of this fiscal year as compared to the corresponding period last year.

Greater import of machinery is, in fact, a clear manifestation of faith in the government policies of industrialisation and deregulation. This augmentation in the productive capacity is the only sure recipe of increasing production, generating exportable surpluses and rectifying balance of trade in the long run.

20. I would like, now, to mention some of the important steps taken by the Government during the last year for promoting exports and giving an impetus to economic and commercial activities.

21. As you are aware a long and persistent demand of the exporting community was about adoption of a simple, frictionless system of taxation which would not involve filing of any return or attending any proceedings in the tax offices.

Such a system in the form of fixed withholding tax on exports has been adopted in the budget for 1992-93.

22. This very significant step was taken with the Prime Minister's personal intervention. I am confident that our exporters will be able to take full benefit from the new system and pay, henceforth, single-minded attention to promotion of exports.

23. Another important measure for encouraging setting up of export oriented industries is the proposed establishment of special industrial zones having all the basic facilities like water, gas and telecommunications.

In these zones apart from infrastructure facilities, many other concessions like exemption of customs duty and surcharge and reduced import licence fee on machinery will be available provided at least 60 percent of production is exported and there is a least 40 percent foreign investment.

24. For promotion of exports it is of great importance to rationalise tariffs. We have high rates of tariffs which are being gradually reduced. The maximum tariff rates has been accordingly reduced from 90 to 80 percent.

25. During the course of the current financial year, the Government has, in addition to measures announced in the budget, taken a number of important policy decisions of the kind which normally featured earlier in the Annual Trade Policy. The following further changes were made to boost exports:

i) The inter-agency committee on duty drawback set up by the Government in 1989 was re-activated with the mandatory obligation to take decision by consensus. In case of disagreement an appellate forum comprising secretaries revenue, commerce and industries divisions has been set up.

ii) Certain essential items required by the export oriented industries like power generators for textile processing equipment and air filtration system were allowed to be imported without payment of import duty and other levies.

iii) A task force was set up to formulate a plan of action for boosting exports of non-traditional items.

iv) In response to domestic and international price trends for raw cotton appropriate changes were made in the export duty formula from time to time to keep cotton exports viable.

v) Federal Export Promotion Board has been reorganised.

vi) National Engineering Manufacturers and Exporters Council (NEMEC) has been reactivated.

26. Now I announce decisions relating to the Trade Policy 1992-93 approved by the Federal Cabinet today.

A. Decisions about exports:

a) In order to further improve and streamline the scheme of Export Processing Unit (EPU) designed for ensuring availability of imported inputs at the internationally neutral prices to the value added industries, eligibility for availing of this scheme has been made more realistic. Instead of the present condition that at least 70 percent of production should be exported from the first year it has been decided now that a unit will be eligible for EPU scheme, if 50 percent of its products are exported in the first 2 years and 60 percent in the third year and beyond.

b) Raw materials for further processing from outside the bond have been permitted on the basis of existing controls used for exports.

c) Bond storage period for imported accessories has been extended from the existing one year to two years.

For raw materials and accessories imported free of cost or on credit, the bond storage period will be 3 years. Accessories/raw materials not used will be allowed to be re-exported in their original form.

27. Raw Materials Replenishment (RMR) Scheme has been improved. At present the complex procedures and stringent time consuming scheme for redemption of previous liabilities have greatly detracted from the utility of the scheme. These deficiencies have been remedied and industries operating through bonds have been now allowed to import materials and accessories against advance licenses on the condition that 50 percent of the previous liability will have to be redeemed after a period of 2 years.

The monitoring of redemption will be done only by the Customs authorities who will count redemption from the date of importation of materials and not from the date of issue of import licenses.

28. In line with the policy of the government to deregulate the economy and to eliminate duplication and reduce procedural formalities, requirements of import permit for imports of freely importable items under SRO [statutory rules and orders] 68, 69 and 722 has been abolished.

In case some percentage of goods manufactured from imported inputs is transferred to the domestic market, 6 percent import permit fee shall be added to the customs duties proportionate to the inputs.

30. The Trade Policy for 1991-92 provided for zero rated import of machinery, spares and accessories for the value added textile and leather industries.

It has been decided to extend this facility to the surgical goods, sports goods and cutlery industries. Sports goods and surgical goods industries have been allowed import of their identifiable machinery, spares and accessories free of Iqra surcharge and import licence fee.

Customs duty is already exempt on the import of these machineries. Import of machinery, spares and accessories for cutlery industry has been allowed free of Customs duty, Iqra surcharge and Import Licence fee.

31. To boost the export of sports goods, import of cork and willow has been allowed at a net duty rate of 5 percent. Import of un-strung rackets made of materials including steel, fibre glass, aluminium, grafite, along with casings/guts (both natural and artificial) has been allowed for re-export after the rackets are strung.

32. To boost production of high count yarn, import of combing machines has been allowed at zero Customs Duty, 5 percent Iqra surcharge and 6 percent Import Licence fee.

Facility of deferred payment of Iqra surcharge for 2 years will be available.

33. On the consideration of encouraging production of high count yarn duty on export of cotton yarn of about 40 counts has been reduced by 50 percent.

On the other hand import duty on cotton yarn of 60 counts and above has been reduced from 50 percent to total incidence of 16 percent.

34. To boost the export of farm products following decisions have been taken:

(a) Exporters of fresh fruits/vegetables have been given facility of duty drawback on the packing material at the rate to be fixed by the government.

(b) Live plants and seeds of vegetables, fruits and flowers of temperate region have been allowed to be imported free of duty, surcharge, sales tax and import licence fee.

(c) A freight subsidy up to 25 percent of the actual freight paid on exports of fruits, vegetables, shall be paid provided these goods are air-lifted by PIA [Pakistan International Airline] or shipped by PNSC [Pakistan National Shipping Corporation] vessels. This facility shall be admissible over and above the special freight rates for fruits and vegetables.

35. There is considerable potential for three way trade. Currently the State Bank of Pakistan allows such trading through back to back L/C [Letter of Credit] on the

condition that the value of the export L/C is at least 10 percent higher. To develop three way trade it has been decided to allow three way merchant trading through back to back L/Cs for crude oil, wheat, rubber, cotton, tea, sugar and fertiliser for re-export.

Details will be announced in my Press conference on 2 July, 1992.

36. To redress the problems relating to cargo and telecommunication facilities a committee comprising secretaries, ministries of commerce, defence, finance, communications and railways has been set up. This committee will recommend measures for liberalisation of civil aviation and telecommunication sectors.

37. In order to improve labour productivity and to ensure quality of exportable products, it has been decided that the labour laws applicable in the Export Processing Zone may also be made applicable to all export oriented units operating under CBR [Central Board of Revenue] Notification Nos. 69, 722 and 962 provided such units export at least 70 percent of their production.

38. To promote the export of engineering goods, additional facilities are being provided to the export of engineering items. Details will be announced in my Press conference.

39. Import of seasoning plants required by wood/furniture industry has been exempted from the levy of Customs Duty, Iqra Surcharge and Import Licence fee.

40. To encourage export of furniture and building materials 75 percent income earned from the export of furniture, doors and windows has been exempted from payment of income tax.

41. In order to encourage export of ceramics, it has been decided to give freight subsidy at the rate of 25 percent if goods are shipped on PNSC vessels.

42. To promote export of imitation jewellery exporters have been allowed to import following metals and semi-precious stones at 5 percent import duty:—

i) Synthetic stones.

ii) Base metal clad with silver.

45. Export Credit Guarantee Scheme was introduced by the government in 1962 to assist extension of export trade of the country.

To make the scheme more effective it has been decided to extend the operational and under-writing capacity of the scheme by enhancing the capital base from the existing Rs 3 crore to Rs[rupees]50 crore. The enhanced level would be achieved over a period of 5 years by providing Rs 10 crore every year.

46. To facilitate export of dry fruits imported from Afghanistan directly to other countries, it has been decided that the dry fruits imported from Afghanistan

may be allowed to be re-exported against submission of a bank guarantee equivalent to the value of Customs Duty, Iqra Surcharge and Sales Tax.

47. To ensure the export of footwear, import of footwear machinery, spares and accessories has been allowed without payment of Customs Duty, Iqra Surcharge and Import Licence fee subject to the following conditions:-

1) 25 percent of production to be exported in the first 3 years.

2) 50 percent of the production to be exported in subsequent years.

49. To accord due recognition at the highest level to the exporters for the pivotal role played by them in the national economy. "Prime Minister's Awards for Excellence and Achievements in Exports" have been instituted. These awards will be bestowed by the prime minister himself.

50. Export licences will be issued with initial validity of one year instead of 3 months.

B. Decisions About Imports

52. In line with the policy of the government for continued liberalisation of imports, it has been decided to remove additional 21 items from the negative list. Details will be given in my Press conference.

53. Banks and security companies have been allowed to import armoured security vans. In order to ensure that facility is not misused import is being allowed subject to certain specific conditions.

54. Requirement of recommendations of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources for import of lubricating oils, mineral oils and greases has been dispensed. Import will be now allowed freely but in accordance with the specifications to be notified by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources from time to time.

55. Import of second hand travelling rugs, blankets and footwear has been allowed.

56. Monetary ceilings for the import of machinery for all categories of imports against cash have been increased.

This is applicable for commercial imports, machinery imports for initial installation, expansion and BMR of units other than textile sector. I will announce the details in my Press conference.

57. In order to enable the industrial units to appropriately plan well in advance for balancing and modernisation it has been decided to issue advance import licence for import of machinery under balancing and modernisation for an amount equivalent to the unit's entitlement for three years with the condition that L/Cs against such advance import licence will be opened during a particular year for an amount not exceeding the prescribed entitlement in that year.

58. In order to place the smaller industrial unit who meet their requirements from commercial importers, at par with direct industrial importers it has been decided to dispense with the distinction between industrial and commercial importers for the purpose of tariff.

Both of them have been allowed to import industrial raw material at uniform rate of Custom Duty and taxes.

The concessionary rates where applicable would continue.

59. In order to take advantage of derred [as published] payment arrangements, imports on consignment basis has been allowed. Presently it is allowed only on case to case basis with the permission of State Bank of Pakistan.

60. To enable prompt disposal of frustrated cargo and avoid unnecessary congestion at the ports and litigation, it has been decided to allow release of such cargo against new import licence issued in respect of such cargo to any other importer authorised by the foreign supplier.

61. Import of three chemicals which have the potential of being used in the manufacture of narcotics drugs has been restricted by the industrial consumer concerned only and strictly in accordance with their requirements.

62. To prevent hazards to health, import of asbestos has been restricted to industrial consumers only who will be allowed to import the items strictly in accordance with the requirements determined by the government.

63. To educate and warn general public about the dangers of smoking, it has been decided that all packets of imported cigarettes would also carry the prescribed health warning both in English and Urdu.

64. Import licence for items other than machinery with initial validity of 12 months have been made extendable for two years on additional payment of 0.25 percent of the unutilized value of the licences for each 6 months.

In case of machinery import licences have been made extendable for three years from the date of expiry of initial validity on similar terms.

65. These are the salient features of the Trade Policy for 1992-93. Despite very real constraint the government has been providing unprecedented support for a sustained growth in exports and liberalising the import regime in the larger national interest.

In the policy we have further translated our commitment to self-reliance into policy initiatives. But the positive outcome in this context does not depend alone on the efforts of the Ministry of Commerce or that of other agencies of the government.

Success depends on constant concerted and well coordinated nation-wide efforts. This great venture of harnessing forces of international trade for the national prosperity calls for exceptional dedication and positive mental attitude on the part of government functionaries,

contribution of our hardworking farmers and labourers; and dynamism and innovation of our entrepreneurs.

I do recognize that we have to operate in an international trade arrangement which is not only unfavourable due to recession but also hostile as it is protectionist, blocking market access to our products. And there is ever growing competition from other developing countries.

67. Ours is a nation pulsating with life and vitality. We have a work force which is diligent and willing to learn new skills. Our country has geographical proximity to the affluent Middle Eastern and emerging Central Asian markets. Our potential is thus, far more than our achievements.

The IJI government under the inspiring leadership of the Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif has unflinching determination and commitment to help the nation to realize its potential.

We in all humility seek Almighty Allah's blessings for success in our endeavours.

Pakistan Painsdabad.

New Five-Year Plan Seen Full of Shortfalls

92AS1317G Karachi DAWN (Supplement) in English
11 Jul 92 p VI

[Article by A.S. Yousufi: "Shortfall Likely in Most Target Areas"]

[Text] Given its budgetary position (owing to the Rs[rupees]900 billion debt repayment and defence requirements); poor global prospects of external resource availability; large investment needs of social sectors; persisting energy crisis; unchecked population explosion and high inflation, the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] Government is most over ambitious when it sets out almost unattainable 8th Plan target of 7 percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth—knowing fully well that the 7th Plan growth target—of 6.5 percent—shall be a maximum of 5.5 percent in real terms.

Similarly, a shortfall had earlier been recorded in the GDP growth in the 6th Plan—which attained 6.1 percent against the envisaged 6.5 percent. Hence experts have advised that the growth target should be fixed at a maximum of 6 percent to make things look more realistic. The proposal is likely to come up at the next ECNEC [Executive Committee of the National Economic Council] meeting fixed for July 9 (if not postponed).

Other seemingly impossible targets—out of a total of 19 fixed for the 8th Plan are—reducing population growth to 2.7 percent (the same having remained 3.1 percent over the years in spite of best official efforts); meeting 50 percent of the demand for machinery and capital equipment through local production; attained self-sufficiency in the production of wheat and sugar; reducing share of consumer goods (including raw materials) in total

imports from 60 percent to 40 percent with corresponding increase of capital goods (including raw materials) from 40 percent to 60 percent; alleviating poverty through an integrated social and rural development programmes; increase of literacy of 50 percent; sewerage facilities for 80 percent urban and 40 percent rural population; basic health service in each union council; one hospital bed per 1,333 of population and reduction in moderate to serve malnutrition by 50 percent.

Population growth

The 6th Plan stipulated a reduction in the rate of population growth from 2.9 to 2.6 percent for which investment of Rs 1,758.9 million was envisaged. However, the contrary was the result; and in 1987, the population rate had actually registered a rise. It was estimated to be 3.1 percent then.

The 7th Plan target is to reduce the crude birth rate from 42.3 to 38 per 1,000 and Rs 3,535 million were earmarked for the purpose. Pakistan is the ninth most populous country in the world and though a large population is not necessarily a problem by itself, it might lead to perpetuation of poverty because a growing population makes equally larger demand on domestic resources and consequently detracts it from productive investment. This calls for an appraisal of policy instead of wasting valuable billions on the existing system.

Manufacturing

The 7th Plan manufacturing growth of 4.9 percent per annum is painfully below the target of 8.1 percent. The performance of small industries sector has been satisfactory at 8.4 percent but large-scale industrial sector demolished all hopes. That would mean the target was not realistic. Nor is the 8th Plan target (envisaged at 50 percent of the total domestic requirement).

Performance of the energy sector has also been below expectations and unless proper attention is given it would be near to impossible to achieve economic growth. That would mean WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority] should pay more attention to the development of hydel power in the country. The NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] is believed to have a generating potential of 5,000 MW [megawatts] for which specific allocations shall be needed in the 8th Plan.

Almost same is true of the agriculture sector where, officially speaking, under the 7th Plan only 4.3 percent growth was achieved against targeted 4.5 percent. The Plan is stated to have failed in achieving targets in all major crops except cotton. So the self-sufficiency in wheat escapes our planners while sugar industry is already in big trouble (particularly in NWFP where sugar mills are operating at less than 50 percent of capacity—thanks to the government's misdirected and fast changing policies. We are likely to continue to depend on imports both in wheat and sugar unless some very effective measures are adopted.

An expert official commentary on the economic activity stresses that contrary to the principles adopted by the IJI Government, total economic activity should not be left to the private sector because the state has important obligations to the people of underdeveloped and backward areas. It, therefore, emphasises duty of the state towards the economic welfare of such people. It also questions the availability of knowhow with the private sector and demands to know if the private sector is honest enough to undertake the economic functions and deliver the services to the masses.

The government planners suggest that the 8th Plan must delineate activities which the private sector can undertake honestly and judiciously and suggests that the state should promote economic activity in the less developed areas of the country.

The policy framework of the 8th Plan states:

1. The state will not intervene in market to affect prices. Administered or regulated prices in industry, trade and utilities and the support prices for agriculture will be phased out;
2. Government will intervene to promote the establishment of competitive markets;
3. Fiscal policy will be designed to provide incentives to increase efficiency and economy;
4. Tariffs will be judiciously reduced and rationalised;
5. Monetary, exchange rate and reserve management shall be the responsibility of the State Bank of Pakistan;
6. Export promotion and import liberalisation to be the cornerstone of commercial policy; and
7. Special needs of sectors, regions and social groups and investment in human resource development and for environment protection will be met through budget.

The main theme is stated to be:

1. Agricultural policies will be designed to maintain growth well above population growth;
2. Industrial policies will lead the way forward to high growth; and
3. Water Accord and power projects and road network will be policy initiatives; and human development will be attended to Social Action Programme [SAP].

Economic experts have suggested that the economic planning should not be guided only by consideration of growth rates but the whole plan should be so developed that improvement of social indicators is ensured.

They have said that social sector programmes, once initiated, should be properly evaluated and monitored and their implementation should be guarded by legislation irrespective of the change of government whereas

development lag of underdeveloped areas be removed through planned public sector investments.

With regards to the SAP, they want the 1992-93 strategy of the Social Action Programme should be made part of the 8th Plan so designed that the menace of unemployment and under-employment is reduced to the minimum. They want education should be so structured as to meet market demand by producing quality manpower, which will mean technical education should be separated from general education, labour, manpower sectors and the functional education be the target of the basic education. The experts also want environment protection and its improvement to be made a part of sustained growth.

The ECNEC is going to handle these issues. And how realistically it does so as remains to be seen. If it fails to come up to expectations and still goes along with false promises to maintain, or even to improve if possible, its political image, the IJI government is going to deliver nothing.

External Debt Said Nearing 25 Billion Dollars

92AS1305C Karachi JANG in Urdu 25 Jun 92 p 1

[News Report: "Profits of Foreign Banks in Pakistan Exceed those of Pakistani Banks; External Debt Has Now reached 24 Billion 700 Million Dollars; Every Pakistani Owes 9,573 Rupees; Statement by Sabqatullah"]

[Text] Karachi (commerce reporter): The country's foreign debt has reached 24,703,286,000 dollars. These figures were revealed by Sabqatullah, deputy governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, in a meeting arranged by the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Addressing the meeting, he said that foreign banks, which controlled only 11.74 percent of the deposits and 13.57 percent of the loans had pretax profits that were larger than those earned by domestic nationalized banks in the amount of 853,520,000 [rupees?]; the profits of foreign banks totalled 2,441,510,000 rupees; Pakistani nationalized banks made a profit of 1,587,940,000 rupees. The deputy governor of the State Bank said that every Pakistani owed 9,573 rupees in domestic and foreign debt whereas the per capita income was 10,358 rupees.

Five Billion Rupees in Foreign Currency Deposits Lost

92AS1305B Karachi JANG in Urdu 25 Jun 92 p 1

[News Report: "State Bank Lost 5 Billion Dollars in Foreign Currency Deposits; Statement by Deputy Governor of the State Bank"]

[Text] Karachi (commerce reporter): Mr. Sabqatullah, deputy governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, revealed that the Government of Pakistan and the State Bank lost 5 billion rupees in foreign currency deposits; he attributed the loss to the fact that Pakistani and foreign banks shared

in the profits but not in the losses. Addressing a large meeting of businessmen and industrialists arranged by the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the deputy governor of the State Bank said that now these banks would have to share in the losses as well as the profits. He added that after the recent experiences of

the Indus and Mehran banks, the State Bank had become very cautious. He said that private banks would have to increase their deposits. Earlier, the chairman of the Federation, Mian Habibullah, gave the welcoming address and the chairman of the Banking Committee, Majid Sultan Khaja, presented points from the working papers.

Submarine Purchase From France Outlined*92AS1305A Karachi JANG in Urdu 4 Jul 92 p 1*

[News Report: Pakistan Will Buy Augusta-90 and Augusta-2000 Submarines From France"]

[Text] Islamabad (JANG Correspondent): Reliable sources report that Pakistan has decided to purchase Augusta-90 and Augusta-2000 submarines for the Pakistan Navy from France and the Government of France has expressed its consent. The purchase agreement between Pakistan and France may be concluded by next week. The sources indicate that in the first stage of the agreement, Pakistan will purchase Augusta-90 submarines that have four torpedo tubes. Augusta-2000 submarines are equipped with six torpedo tubes and are more expensive.

French Minesweeper Purchase Announced*92AS1305D Karachi JANG in Urdu 6 Jul 92 p 1*

[News Report: "Pakistan Will Purchase Three Minesweepers From France; The First Eridan-Class Minesweeper Will Be Handed Over to the Pakistani Navy in September or October; the Third Will Be Built in Pakistan"]

[Text] Karachi (staff reporter): According to a press release Sunday by ISPR [Interservice Public Relations] in Islamabad, a French minesweeper and mine destroyer of the Eridan-class will be obtained by the Pakistan Navy this September or October; the ship has been named

PNS MUNSIF [judge]. Minesweepers of the Eridan-class were used successfully to remove mines from the waters around Kuwait after the recent Gulf war. The addition of these minesweepers to the Pakistan naval fleet will increase its minesweeping capability many times over. Pakistan will acquire three minesweepers of this class from France, which will be added to the Pakistan naval fleet; these ships are the most modern of their kind and head the list of French war equipment. The second minesweeper will be built in France but following the transfer of technology, the third one will be built in Pakistan. These ships will replace the edight minesweepers of the Pakistan naval fleet, which were built in the United States in 1957; six are out of commission and two are still in use. In these modern times, sea mines are effective weapons and in war, prove dangerous to navigation and ocean routes. They are also difficult to detect and destroy. Mine hunters constitute effective counter-offensive weapons in such dangerous situations. The basic function of minesweepers is to protect ships travelling to ports and commercial harbors through coastal and deep waters. Eridan-class mine hunters are being built jointly by France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; their design is of high quality and they carry the latest mine hunting equipment. Their computer systems detect mines and gather other important information. The wire guide equipment hidden under the water line carries TV and explosives, which can safely destroy mines. In addition to destroying mines, the ships carry out minesweeping operations and can be used also as headquarter ships for training, upkeep, and diving operations.

Social Service Spending Remaining Stagnant

92AS1242E Karachi DAWN in English
20 Jun 92 pp V-VI

[Article by Laila A. Karmally: "Negligible Increase in Real Spending on Social Services"]

[Text] "The weakest area of the development process in Pakistan has been the slow-moving social indicators—in particular literacy, nutrition, health, population welfare, potable water, sanitation and sewerage. If these issues are not addressed urgently and squarely, not only will living conditions worsen, the process of economic progress itself will degenerate making prospects of social and political instability more palpable"—Economic Survey, 1991-92.

Nobody could have put it better. In the above extract, the government itself recognises that it has failed miserably as far as the social sector goes.

Economic Outline

By analysing the per capita real expenditure on health and education, one is able to develop a clear picture of the deeds of the government versus their oft-declared policy commitments. There is certain in-built inaccuracy in the data due to the inconsistencies and inefficiency in official data collection in Pakistan—but if anything, the dismal figures should be viewed with greater conservatism than what is already reflected.

The parameters of this discussion are first set with a look at the overall economic health of the nation. Pakistan's economy grew at an improved rate of 6.4 percent last year (over 5.6 percent in 1990 and 4.6 percent in 1989). Investment soared, the share market surged and our foreign exchange reserves remained stable. But at the same time, there was no let up in inflationary pressure or the squeeze on the internal and external balance of payments.

The population in 1991-92 was estimated at 117.32 million—with the growth rate running at a high of 3.1 percent per annum.

An insight into our national priorities is revealed by looking at our expenditure patterns relative to our earning power (i.e., gross domestic product [GDP] at market prices). According to the latest consolidated statistics tabulated for the year 1990-91, total government expenditure constituted 24.3 percent of GDP. Spending on defence amounted to 6.3 percent of GDP; interest payment 4.8 percent and general administration, 1.2 percent. Spending on education and health corresponded to 3.0 percent of GDP—against the recommended 5.0 percent recommended by the United Nations' development agencies.

The government's priorities may be unmasked by breaking down expenditure on the various sectors as a percentage of total budgetary expenditure. The figures of provincial and federal spending for 1991-92 show that debt-servicing took up 24.6 percent of total expenditure. Defence came in a close second—consuming 23.4 percent of total expenditure.

As opposed to this, total spending on health and education (i.e., both current and development) constituted 11.8 percent of the expense account (see chart 1 [not reproduced]).

A close-up of the education and health sectors will bring to light what real progress has been made in human development and where we stand relative to international standards.

The 1981 Population Census set the adult literacy rate (15+ years) Pakistan at 26.2 percent. Results of the 1980 census have not been made official, but the Ministry of Education and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) set the current estimate at 34.9 percent—which breaks down to 45 percent for males and 20 percent for females. In contrast, the average literacy for all developing countries stands at 60 percent (see table 1 on page 1 [table not reproduced]).

A Look at Education

The Economic Survey for 1991-92 discloses that 12.7 million children are enrolled in primary schools, 3.1 million in middle school and 1.2 million at secondary level. There is a drastic dip at tertiary level—with only 600,000 students enrolled in colleges and 82,000 in universities. While there has been a nine percent improvement in incremental enrollments at primary level over the years 1990-91 to 1991-92, there has been no significant change at middle and secondary levels (see table 2).

Rather than absolute numbers, the focus should be on the enrollment participation rate which is calculated by dividing the enrollment at each stage by the total school age population. This provides a handle on the number of places in schools relative to the growing population. Table 2 also shows that there have been minor improvements at primary, middle and secondary levels but as of today, three in every ten children of primary school going age will go without an education for lack of schools/places in schools.

Looking at the male/female breakdown, the participation rate sinks—with five out of every ten girls able to enroll in schools.

The poor overall ratio of 66 percent compares with the 90 percent average enrollment rate for all developing countries arrived at by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its Human Development Report, 1991. The same report places the primary school dropout rate in Pakistan at 51 out of every hundred. In summary, this means that of the seven out of every ten children who do get a place in schools, only three or four complete their education.

It is the long-run aim of all governments to enable the population to spend on social services and thereby have public and private spending play complementary roles. However, in less developed countries, the current role of the public sector is all the more important as market forces alone cannot ensure human development and people lack the purchasing power to provide for themselves.

While monetary expenditure on education has increased over the last four years (albeit at slower pace over recent years), as a percentage of gross national product (GNP), the figure remains at a constant of 2.3 percent. Education's

share of total budgetary expenditure has actually declined to 7.3 percent in the latest budget for 1992-93—indicative of its waning importance from the government's point of view (see table 2).

Table 2. Educational Profile

	1989-90 (Rs)	1990-91 (Rs)	1991-92 (Rs)	1992-93		
Total expenditure (at current prices)	20,884	23,567	27,791	30,292		
(% increase)	—	12.8%	17.9%	8%		
As a % of GNP	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%		
As a % of budgetary expenditure	9.4%	9.5%	9.1%	7.3%		
Expenditure per capita	189	207	237	250		
Real expenditure per capita (inflation 12.5)	—	184	209	222		
Number of educational institutions						
primary	110,917	115,633	119,892			
secondary	928	975	1,151			
tertiary	22	22	23			
Enrolment ('000)						
primary	10,283	11,451	12,721			
secondary	108	117	135			
tertiary	73	74	82			
		1972	1981	1991		
Literacy rates (+15 years) (%)						
All Pakistan	21.7	26.2	34.0			
Rural	14.3	17.2	—			
Urban	41.5	47.4	—			
Male	11.6	15.2	21.3			
Female	30.2	36.0	45.5			
	1990-91			1991-92		
Participation rates (%)*						
	Both Sexes	F	M	Both Sexes	F	M
Primary stage (5-9 years)	65.7	47.8	82.9	66.3	49.2	83.0
Middle stage (10-12 years)	41.9	27.4	55.4	44.6	29.4	58.9
Secondary stage (13-18 years)	24.9	15.5	33.6	27.2	17.2	36.6

*Enrolment at each stage divided by total school age population X 100.

The most interesting revelation comes in the real expenditure per capita on education—which takes into consideration inflation and the growing population. Table 2 reflects that in the current budget, the authorities plan to spend Rs 222 (or only Rs 13 more over last year) on per child's education in the current budget.

Independent experts believe that up to 60 percent of the allocations are siphoned off to pay for establishment oriented expenditure such as salaries and building maintenance. Hence, only 40 percent is spent on actual field improvements. This implies that the improvement in quality of education has been negligible—as even the

entire incremental sum of Rs 13 is not even enough to purchase one book per child.

For a sense of perspective, it may interest readers to know that the authorities spend some Rs 700 per capita on defence and Rs 800 per capita on debt-servicing.

Promises, Promises

Aware that progress in education has not kept pace with progress in other areas, the authorities have declared their intention to raise the literacy rate to 80 percent by the end of the century, improve the quality of education,

enlarge facilities for technical and vocational training as well as bring the less developed rural areas at par with the other parts of the country.

Amongst other things, the government has launched the Social Action Programme [SAP] and a matching grants scheme this year to promote public and private investment in the field of education. However, the figures for the latest year have already taken the SAP into account and any private educational institutions that may be set up will be on the upper end of the affordability scale.

The health profile of the nation relative to international standards can be seen in table 1. Life expectancy here averages 55 years, while that for all developing countries averages at 62.8 years. The under five mortality rate in Pakistan ranks far below international standards—indicative of the fact that 45 percent of the population lacks access to basic health facilities like sanitation, immunisation and early preventive medication.

The poor performance in the health sector should be viewed against the background of the above very pitiable

base statistics. The health sector has always lagged even far behind education, and at present, health facilities in Pakistan are extremely inadequate. In 1991, there was only one doctor per 2,008 patients, one dentist per 52,789 patients and one hospital bed for every 1,506 persons (see table 3).

The improvements over the last three years have been minimal. At present, there are some 4,384 Basic Health Units (BHUs) in the country—some 171 more than last year. Rural Health Units (RHUs) number 464—with only five established over the last year. This means there are 24,200 people to a health unit.

Per capita real expenditure on health has been estimated at Rs 79 per person in the current budget—which represents a Rs 16 rise over the previous year's allocation. A closer examination of the federal government's development programme reveals that disbursements on health and nutrition, social welfare and manpower development have all taken absolute monetary cuts, with the funds having been rechanneled towards industry, power, transport and communications.

Table 3. Health Profile

	1989-90 (Rs)	1990-91 (Rs)	1991-92 (Rs)	1992-93 (Rs)
Total expenditure (at current prices)	7,218	7,738	8,224	10,721
(%) increase)	—	7.2	6.2	30.3
As a % of GNP	0.80	0.77	0.68	0.84
As a % budgetary expenditure	3.2	3.1	2.7	2.59
Expenditure per capita	65	68	70	88
Real expenditure per capita (inflation 12.5%)	—	60	62	78
Number of Basic Health Units	3,818	4,213	4,384	—
Number of Rural Health Units	448	459	464	—
Population per:				
hospital bed	1,636	1,535	1,506	
doctor	2,263	2,127	2,008	
dentist	55,808	53,134	51,789	

The urban-based curative health care system in Pakistan has been reoriented in recent years towards primary health care at grassroot level and increasing access of mothers and children to preventive care—and rightly so. The SAP envisages a role for the private sector in the health arena—with plans to develop a cadre of community health care workers as a bridge between the community and health care units. But plans not backed up by sufficient resource allocations or inefficient utilisation of resources are as good as no plans at all.

The health and education sectors in Pakistan face several obstacles stemming from the poor attitude of the government. The lack of commitment of the authorities to the betterment of the people has resulted in consistent underallocation of funds. Instead of the recommended figure of five percent, we spent three percent on the two

sectors combined. The trend has been towards a decline in federal spending and a congruent increase in provincial and (to a certain extent) private and non-governmental expenditure.

The state must be reminded that lagging as far behind as we are, the authorities cannot be allowed to shrug their responsibilities nor can economic concessions to trade and industry be allowed to supercede health and education on terms of importance.

Perhaps equally constraining as the lack of funds has been the underutilisation and mismanagement of existing allocations. A study carried out of the social sectors and the Social Action Plan has found that structural inefficiencies and poor planning have resulted in the gross underutilisation of funds (in some cases as low

as 40 to 50 percent) over the seven Five-Year Plan periods. Further, due to inflation, physical achievements have remained below targets.

The issue of intrasectoral allocation between field and establishment costs has already been discussed and it suffices enough to repeat that very little of the government's already meagre mismanaged allocations materialises into books, equipment and learning aids for children.

There exists the serious problem of gender and regional disparities in Pakistan's health and education sectors—the most deprived lot being that of rural females. This has to be addressed urgently as world development agencies have discovered, it is the mothers in the rural areas that are going to be the conduits to changing the destiny of the future generations.

In summary, the supply constraints facing the two sectors include a shortage of facilities (schools and health units) especially in rural areas; poor infrastructure and equipment and the lack [of] proper planning and trained personnel. On the demand side, problems include the backward attitudes of the rural people (who are averse to modern medicine and to educating their daughters) as well as the lack of funds to pay for services needed.

Hence, the government is well-advised to: boost spending on health and education to at least five percent of GNP, improve utilisation by reducing planning rigidities, dealing with corruption and redirecting funds towards basic services, attack the disparities to ensure the nation progresses as a whole and no one group is left behind, and tap the potential of the informal sector (such as voluntary organisations)—which often has the skills and the manpower but lacks funds.

Increased Abuse of Narcotics in Society Viewed

92AS1256A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT (Supplement)
in Urdu 5 Jul 92 pp II

[Editorial: "Increasing Drug Abuse"]

[Text] According to a news report, the police have arrested a drug dealer in the Ferozwala area and seized a huge amount of heroin in his possession. At present, the number of drug users in our country is increasing rapidly, and this curse has spread so much that drug dealers have been arrested as they sell drugs right outside educational institutions. Other countries of the world, in which all kinds of drugs are used, are influencing our country also. This condemned business is cutting the roots of our society, and is jeopardizing the future of our younger generation. It is deplorable that organized crime is involved in this business, and people in the neighborhood complain that the drug dealers have a lot of influence and pull. That is why we could not get rid of these drug lords. The heroin factories are still operating in tribal areas. The production from these factories is smuggled into the rest of the country. Even though law

enforcement agencies, especially those with the responsibility for monitoring drug production, are trying seriously to stop smuggling and to control drug traffic, they are only successful to an extent. The situation is so bad, however, that it is important that we close all the places of business from where drugs are smuggled. If we do not quickly control this epidemic, there is fear that it will worsen during the next two years. Therefore, the government should make the drug enforcement agency more organized and effective a priority undertaking. In addition, law enforcement agencies should also be better organized.

Government Ban on Campus Politics Assessed

Action Praised

92AS1262A Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jul 92 p 7

[Editorial: "A Judicious Move"]

[Text] Protests from so-called liberal opinion notwithstanding, the Supreme Court's directive banning politics on the campuses will be widely welcomed. Higher education in Pakistan has been so badly disrupted by the most pernicious type of student activism and indiscipline over the years that those who are serious about studying—that is the overwhelming majority of the students—would feel greatly relieved at the prospect of being liberated from the tyranny and blackmail of politically motivated student groups and factions and their irresponsible leadership. The fact is that the politicisation of the campuses has simply not meant an active and vigorous competition among various groups with different political ideologies to win the allegiance of the students. If this had been the case, not many would have objected to the students indulging in a bit of politics in the form of debates and discussions, so long as these did not entail the disruption of the educational process.

But unfortunately that is not what student politics has meant in our case. The groups that are active in colleges and universities have close links with the political parties outside. Thus, the political animosities at the national and provincial level tend to get easily transmitted to the academic scene as well. Moreover, the proliferation of arms on the campuses has created a situation of chronic violence and strife among rival groups which cause frequent disruptions of normal academic activities. Worse still, the student parties seek to seize control of the university management and interfere with the teaching process itself. They meddle directly in processes such as admissions, examinations and results, which has reduced the entire higher education system to a farce.

The Supreme Court's ruling, which came in response to some human rights petitions pertaining to cases relating to malpractices in educational institutions, is, therefore, quite timely. True, as a piece of judicial legislation, the directive would encounter serious difficulties in implementation. Thus, asking heads of institutions to obtain undertakings from students that they will not indulge in

politics will not suffice. In the first place, there is the basic need of definitions. What would fall within the purview of "political activities?" Given the common resort to force and intimidation by militant student leaders against the university authorities, what precisely would be the means and methods of dealing with cases of vindictive action by students and groups proceeded against on grounds of political involvement or undisciplined conduct. And how will it be ensured that the teachers themselves do not indulge in politics?

Obviously, some administrative measures will have to be taken to enforce the Supreme Court's directives. A law to that effect enacted by the various provincial assemblies would make the implementation procedure smoother and certain. But ultimately it is the administration that must undertake the responsibility of ensuring that the rules are enacted in clear-cut terms and enforced, so that the virus of militant politics is kept out of the campuses. If the political will exists, there is no reason why educational institutions cannot become true seats of learning once again. The deployment of Rangers at the Karachi University three years ago was considered a controversial step at the time. But it helped eliminate violence on the campus and put an end to unscheduled closures that were destroying the educational process.

What, however, needs to be emphasised is that the university authorities themselves must also be wholeheartedly committed to the cause of education and should not be involved in politics. A few heads might have to roll to purge the teaching fraternity of politics too. But that is a price that has to be paid. All this might sound too draconian and not at all libertarian for tackling the problem of the education sector. But freedom of speech, expression and association are something different from the licence that has come to operate on the campuses. A crucial task for today is to save the educational system from an impending collapse by eliminating the waywardness and indiscipline which have taken control of the campuses. Practice has shown that political activism among students is incompatible with peaceful conditions on the campuses and a wholehearted commitment to learning.

Good for Education

92AS1262B Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jul 92 p 11

[Article by Zia-ul-Islam: "Depoliticising the Campuses"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in an unprecedented move, has imposed a ban on students indulging in politics. In order to emphasise that this is not merely an observation but an order of the court, the honourable judges have specified a simple and unambiguous procedure to ensure the implementation of their decision: students and their parents/guardians shall give an undertaking at the time of admission that the students shall not indulge in politics.

If a student indulges in politics, he shall be expelled from the educational institution without any further notice, and what is most important and significant, "the findings with regard to indulgence in politics given by the head of an institution, under his seal and signature, shall be final and could be questioned only in the Supreme Court. Severe penalties for cheating in examinations and specific steps to eradicate malpractices in this connection have also been ordered.

The sudden and surprising move of the Supreme Court is a curt way of saying, "enough is enough". Although news items are not quite clear as to what exactly became the basis of this powerful judgment of the court, it appears that action has been taken *suo moto* after hearing cases relating to malpractices in the educational system.

While constitutional experts and others who like to indulge in the niceties of law might start the usual controversies about different aspects of this Supreme Court order, the ordinary man in the street will simply love the forcefulness of this judgment. Every word of the interim order rings as emphatic echo in the heart of the helpless parent who, for years, has watched the future of his children sacrificed at the altar of what passes in this country as politics.

For some years now, parents have been silent spectators to senseless murders of their innocent sons and daughters who were not even involved in any kind of politics. When shooting starts between trigger-happy groups of so-called students, it is not the professional agitators who get killed, for they know well how to protect themselves. It is the innocent bystanders who usually receive the bullets.

The affluent families, specially in Karachi, now routinely send their children abroad for education. In most cases this is arranged when the children are nearing the end of their high school. All parents shudder at the thought of leaving their children at the mercy of college 'slaughter-houses'. The bright students of the less affluent parents who manage good grades in their O levels and A levels also head out for foreign colleges who offer scholarships. But all these comprise less than five per cent of the college-level students. The remaining 95 per cent are forced to risk their lives in colleges waiting for the stray bullet euphemistically called student politics in Pakistan.

No sane person in the country who has children or who has any knowledge of what politics means in educational institutions of Pakistan will pause for a moment before praising the bold initiative of the Supreme Court. The only apprehension is that it might never get implemented. And if it does not get implemented, the very act of passing this great order might become instrumental in causing further helplessness to the education system in this country.

It is a basic principle of administration that an order should be passed only when it can be implemented, and a threat should be made only if it can be carried out. When an order is given, the recipient of the order is

threatened with a specific penalty on refusal to obey it. But when he disobeys the order and that penalty is not imposed on him, respect for authority in the entire society dies. The government or other organisation which issues such an order stands exposed for its inability to carry out its own orders. In Pakistan, we have managed to erode the authority of the state by passing laws and orders that we do not or cannot implement. It is this landslide erosion of authority in Pakistan which is the major cause of most evils that haunt us.

The life of an ordinary citizen has become miserable because the state seems to have no authority to protect him from killers, kidnappers and cheaters, or to safeguard his rights from bureaucrats and other state functionaries paid to serve him. The state is as helpless in stopping a speeding vehicle which jumps a red light as it is in punishing a student who shoots in the college or cheats openly in the examination. Over the years, successive governments have lost their authority to get things done by issuing indiscriminate threats and then eating their words.

A stage has been reached where representatives of the state do not even feel embarrassed when the simplest and easiest-to-implement orders issued by them are not carried out. It may be difficult for an S.P. to, say get a murderer arrested, but should it be difficult for him to transfer a lowly constable working directly under his own command from one station to another? It is, and the pity is that SPs openly complain about their impotence in this regard without feeling ashamed. They put the blame on political interference, but that is only half the story: the rest is that their seat is dearer to them than honour. State functionaries have abdicated their authority for petty considerations and public servants have sold their pride cheaply.

The pathetic state of affairs is not lost on the judges of the Supreme Court. They are also men with eyes and ears, and what is more, they also care for the future of this unfortunate country. They are aware that the government is no more able to exercise its writ in matters which are crucial to the survival of this nation. And education is one matter without which no miracle can save the future generations from annihilation. So the highest judicial body of the country has taken upon itself the sacred task of safeguarding the future of this nation. Here is perhaps the last chance for us to apply brakes to the maddening downhill race towards our own destruction.

Let us not start a controversy about intricate details of whether the order is according to the Constitution or not, and how proper it is for the judiciary to pass such an order. In his heart, every sane person knows that only drastic measures can recover what remains of the nearly-dead education system. Now that we have been presented with such an opportunity, let us grab it. Instead of feeling threatened, the government should gratefully capitalise on the immense extra authority showered upon it by the Supreme Court.

The crux of the matter, however, is not everyone's willingness to enforce this order of the court. It is the effectiveness of its implementation. Come August, admissions to educational institutions will start. Heads of institutions are duty-bound to obtain undertakings from students and parents. They are also required to get undertakings from all existing students.

Will they do it? Who will check that undertakings from all the millions of students in the country have been obtained? Well, if we do not want to be bureaucratic there is no need to create a cell to gather and monitor all this information. After all governments collect millions of tons of data on thousands of subjects without being able to get orders based on this data implemented. But then, how will this order get carried out?

Theoretically, every head of an educational institution has been bestowed almost limitless powers over his or her students. Without going through the impossible procedure of obtaining permission from higher authorities, the head of an institution has been given full authority to expel a student if found indulging in politics, and this authority can be challenged only in the Supreme Court! What else could the teachers ask for?

They have been clamouring for magisterial and other kind of powers over students. Now that they can use what amounts to infinite power over their pupils, will they use it? A casual guess is no. They will also plead to the same cliché: being part of the same rotten society, and students and parents being so influential and all that gibberish we are so used to hearing and accepting as valid excuse for all the evils we perpetrate. So who is going to check and monitor if the heads of institutions are actually using the newly-bestowed powers which alone can bring sanity to the educational system?

This is the question which must be answered before we can proceed further in this great endeavour. But one thing is certain. Like the Supreme Court of Pakistan, every Pakistani is crying from the core of his heart: enough is enough. If something is not done now to arrest the rot, perhaps nothing ever will.

Students Face Expulsion

92AS1262C Karachi DAWN in English 2 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by Ahmad Hasan Alvi: "Supreme Court Order; Ban on Politics in Educational Institutions"]

[Excerpt] Rawalpindi, July 1: The Supreme Court of Pakistan on Wednesday ordered banning of participation in politics by students and directed educational institutions to obtain specific undertaking in this regard from parents, guardians and students at the time of admissions.

Deciding a series of petitions pertaining to human rights, the court passed an interim order "as a first step" in cases relating to malpractices in educational institutions.

The educational institutions have been asked to seek and "obtain similar undertakings in respect of all existing enrolled students."

The Supreme Court Bench, comprising three judges, ordered that the time of admission to an educational institution, the students and their parents or guardians shall give an undertaking that the student shall not indulge in politics. Those who fail to comply shall not be allowed admission, it said.

"In case a student indulges in politics violating such undertaking, he shall be expelled from the institution without any further notice."

The Supreme Court Bench included chief Justice Mohammad Afzal Zullah, Mr. Justice Mohammad Afzal Lone and Mr. Justice Saiduz Zaman Siddiqui. [passage omitted]

Will Further Alienate Youth

92AS1262D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by A.B.S. Jafri: "Can't We Manage Just a Bit of Sanity?"]

[Text] Why is Socrates called the father of philosophy, or at least Western philosophy? He propounded on theory, produced no book, laid down no law, nor left any philosophy. And yet he remains the unquestioned father of philosophy! Why?

The answer would differ from one person to another. But the question is tantalising enough to be asked and answered. My answer is that Socrates is rated as the father of philosophy because he invited and, up to a point, provoked people to think. And thinking is the birth of philosophy.

"Good morning, Master," a young man would greet the "spoiler of youth" of Athens. "Good morning to you," Socrates would return, but hasten to add: "wait a minute young man. A good morning it is, as you say, but what is good?"

You start defining what is good. An endless process of thought starts. Endless. The basic, perhaps the only, lesson Socrates has for us is: "Please define your terms."

Politics is a dirty word in the dictionary of many pious and wise people in our country. But by the general reckoning is that its content of dirt keeps increasing and decreasing. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was very much in this game of politics. And his reputation of being incorruptible remained without the smallest speck of doubt. How come, a man remained engaged in the dirty game of politics and left the stage with the indisputable reputation of being utterly unsullied? But we also know how Ghulam Mohammad muddied politics and called politicians all manner of unflattering names. He did treat them as dirt. Iskandar Mirza didn't think much of politicians. In fact, he didn't have time for politics at

all. Ayub Khan treated politics and politicians with as much regard as a cat would have for a famished mouse. But he took his time to come to terms with politics and politicians, too. And there were flashes in which he played politics with considerable skill.

Gen. Zia played politics all the time, with everybody, in uniform and in civvies on the right, centre and the left, with the secular and with the Islamist, with the ardent Pakistani patriot and with the equally irreconcilable separatist. Zia carried politics to the labouring classes and had his very own trade unions, hounding the genuine trade unions out of the field. Zia carried politics to colleges and university campuses and had his own student bodies.

Remnants of these Zia-sponsored political entities are still around. With some of these, the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] and the Jeay Sindhis to name only two, the army is now engaged in that province.

The Quaid-i-Azam also carried politics to the colleges and the universities. He carried students with him and who does not know that the students were in the vanguard of the forces under the direct command of the Quaid-i-Azam, the founder of our country?

So, Quaid carried politics to the students. Gen. Zia carried politics to the students. Is it difficult to see the difference between politicians and politics—between the politics of the Quaid-i-Azam, the Father of the Nation, and the politics of Gen. Zia the bane of the same nation?

It is obvious, therefore, that at this moment when politics is becoming a controversial issue in a certain context, we take the simple advice of Socrates and define the term in contention?

What is politics? We have got to have a clear idea of what it is we are going to recommend or reject for ourselves and for others. Quite obviously there is a missing link in the argument which either praises politics or decries it without first setting forth in clear term what exactly is the sum and substance of the stuff in question. The situation at the moment is that neither the advocates for—nor those against politics have cared to define what they are so emphatically talking about one way or the other.

We have seen that politics is something which can have many shapes and forms. Among these, the two most easily recognisable and distinguishable brands have been identified above: the politics of the Quaid-i-Azam and the politics of Gen. Zia. For a present day example, we can add to the former category the politics of Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress. The moral imperatives of the politics of the Quaid and Mandela are too obvious and compellingly convincing to call for a debate.

In many countries across the world, the voting age is being lowered to 18 years. This has been promised to the people of Pakistan also. At 18 most boys and girls whose

parents have the requisite means are in colleges and universities. Even at 21 many of them are in universities engaged in higher studies, research or have started their career as lecturers and assistant professors. They are a part of the university life and they have a vote. Duly enfranchised citizens are supposed to be quite mature and dependable to look after themselves politically, make their political decisions and choices. And no other citizen has a right to interfere.

Evidently, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif does not clearly see the question of politics and the young voter (or one about to be a duly qualified voter within a year or two). Mr. Nawaz Sharif has recently found occasion—or excuse—to express his intention to prepare the ground for legislation which would presumably have the effect of disenfranchising the enfranchised young men and women in colleges and universities who have the very great advantage of university education.

It seems to be only fair to request the Prime Minister to please elaborate his philosophy on the question of politics and university educated young men and women of the country. The young men and women concerned would be within their right to expect the PM [Prime Minister] to say what good reason does he have to place any stifling restrictions on their basic freedoms and rights as citizens of a free country with professing to be democratic even if the credentials are not entirely convincing.

Indeed Mr. Nawaz Sharif's intention to prevent university educated young men and women and young teachers in colleges and universities puts his own commitments with democratic freedoms in serious doubt. And no wonder, he is the pupil of Gen. Zia and promise-bound to carry on his (Zia's) mission. But even the General did not ban politics on the campuses. Why should Mr. Nawaz Sharif entertain such un-Zia-like thoughts?

This is not the first time we have heard this type of witch-doctoring of the political ailments of Pakistan. Let alone the college and university students and the faculty, we have had a line of quacks who have found the whole people of Pakistan fit only to be declared unfit for politics. From Ghulam Mohammad to Gen. Zia, the common theme has been that politics is something from which the nation as a whole should be quarantined. But the fact remains that these very self-appointed saviours have left the country in vastly worse shape than it was when they grabbed it by the scruff.

The only kind of politics which needs to be banned is the politics of the gun and heroin. And this is just the kind of politics the last of the dictators invented and promoted, actually starting with the college and university campuses. Today not only Sindh but the whole country is in its pernicious grip to a greater or lesser degree. Ban this politics but, imagine the irony, that it is this very brand of politics which the government of Nawaz Sharif has failed to combat. Calling in the army is a confession too loud and clear to need any argument for or against.

Can the advocates of ostracising the educated youth and intellectuals of the country from participating in the nation's politics deny that these men and women represent the cream of the country? In the fitness of things, the leadership of the future ought to come from this very quarter. The bane of Pakistan is that it has had too many quacks wielding power to the violently imposed exclusion of the genuine leaders of sane public opinion.

Banning of Student Unions Said To Perpetuate Elitism

92AS1243G Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
7 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by Shireen M. Mazari, "Education in Pakistan: An Irritation for the Elite"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The recent Supreme Court order that student unions should be banned has been welcomed by a wide spectrum of opinion within the country as the solution to all ills that beset college and university education in the country. If only the reality was so simple, the truth of the matter is that student unions are hardly the root cause of the problems that beset the campuses across the nation.

Over the years, the ruling elite has not only neglected the education sector, it has been sending its own offsprings overseas at an ever younger age. In the fifties and sixties, the elite traditionally sent its children abroad after graduation. But, by the seventies, there was a trend towards packing off the offspring overseas almost immediately after matriculation/A Levels. These trends have coincided with a general decline in higher education since the seventies.

As for the issue of primary and secondary schooling, the ruling elite has opted for the private sector and, therefore, has had no qualms over the plight of public sector education standards. In fact, the elite has found an ideal way to perpetuate its status in society for generations to come, by getting the masses involved in the debate over which language/languages should be the base of education in the country.

Even as this debate rages, the elite continues to educate its children in the private English-medium schools. Of course, when job opportunities arise, especially in the private sector, this schooling makes all the difference! This dual-track policy governing basic education undoubtedly ensures the perpetuation not only of the ruling elite but also of the budgetary neglect of this critical sector. In addition, when the salary of a primary school teacher is barely more than that of a peon in a federal ministry, the profession is not going to attract the best and the brightest in the land. So the vicious cycle of declining standards in primary and secondary education continues uninterrupted.

Meanwhile, by the time the youth enter institutions of higher learning, they have already been exposed to a value-system which negates education. At this level,

successive governments seem to have adopted the attitude that merely providing an increasing number of colleges and universities is sufficient for the cause of higher education—regardless of the quality of these institutions.

Hordes of youth enter these institutions where a socially bereft environment greets them—from the minimal human conditions that prevail in the hostels to the lack of any extra-curricular activities. The physical surroundings themselves are conducive to breeding frustration and violence amongst the student population. While university administrations spend vast amounts on beautifying administrative blocks of the universities, the living quarters of the students barely possess the most basic hygienic amenities, and there is no incentive for students to care for this minimal habitat.

Of course, for the ruling elite, this is hardly an issue, since most of its offspring have managed to proceed abroad or to enter some of the few private institutions of higher learning within the country. Therefore, pleas for more budgetary attention to this sector go unheard.

When premier institutions like the Quaid-i-Azam University are informed by the UGC [University Grants Commission] that only funds for salary expenses will be forthcoming, and they are faced with deficits of 3 crores, where should they turn to? Private funding from foreign governments like the Japanese has its own drawbacks—for instance, while the QAU [Quaid-i-Azam University] has benefited tremendously from Japanese assistance to its Natural Science Faculty in the form of equipment, it is now finding itself unable to meet the recurring costs of keeping that equipment operational—especially the electricity bills!

One option of course would be to increase the tuition fees, but no university administration or government has the will to implement this decision in view of the expected wrath of the “dreaded” student community. With or without student unions, the country today is paying the price of its ruling elite’s using successive generations of students to serve its political ends!

To blame student unions for creating a problem on the campuses is to ignore the reality that all over the world student unions function in an orderly and healthy fashion. In fact, structured and legitimate political activity on campuses is part of the civic education of the youth. Educating the students in the norms of democratic political culture and behaviour—including the norm of tolerance for diversity—is surely a prerequisite for the strengthening of the democratic structures of the nation.

It is the militarisation of society, including the youth, that has led to indiscipline on campuses. In fact, student violence and lawlessness on the campuses increased when legitimate student unions were banned by General Zia, and political activity on the campuses went underground. In addition, the banning of student unions and, ostensibly, political parties from campuses, merely led to

the revival of narrow, ethnic groupings on campuses that aggravated the polarisation amongst the youth—hardly a conducive step towards national integration.

Compounding the problem and encouraging the students towards aggression has been the compromising attitude of university administrations towards the upholding of institutional rules and regulations. For instance, reared in the recent traditions of the universities of the Punjab, successive Vice-Chancellors of Quaid-e-Azam University have always succumbed to student pressure when the academic departments have applied existing rules and regulations. Rather than rationalising the rules—and removing those they cannot enforce—they have found it easier to penalise teachers for enforcing these rules.

Within this dismal educational environment, what has been the role of the teachers? There is no doubt that over the decades, the spirit of dedication and excitement is difficult to find amongst the teaching community. While those entering this profession never expected financial bonanzas, there was generally an expectation of professional fulfilment and societal recognition.

Instead, teachers have consistently faced pressure and threats of violence from administrators and students—while ruling elite continues to keep educators out of the mainstream of the national polity. Whether it is an issue of utilising the expertise of these educators or one of allowing university professors to move onto service Grades 21 and 22, the ruling elite has shown an intransigence that can only be termed absurd and myopic. Nor can teachers pursue research unhindered—thanks to economic and socio-political constraints. No wonder, few parents wish their children to opt for the teaching profession—given choices like the CSS!

In return, teachers have increasingly lost interest in their prime duty of imparting knowledge, and so one often faces a situation where a student being interviewed on his B.A. subjects calmly—and with impunity—retorts that he, along with his contemporaries, got his first division because they were all allowed to cheat! In any event, as any student will inform you, it is irrelevant what knowledge he acquires as long as the degree—that piece of paper—is his!

After all, his job opportunities will depend upon his contacts more than on his educational development. As for the elite’s children, the few that come back will be favoured candidates for the lucrative jobs in the private sector—as well as having the advantage of competing favourably in the public sector, thanks to a solid education.

So in the final analysis, while the ruling elite happily continues to regard the education sector as a mere irritant that requires cursory attention now and again, the public allows its youth to be cheated of the basic right to proper education. In such circumstances, the issue of student unions merely diverts from the real structural and attitudinal problems dominating the nation’s education sector. By banning student unions and legitimate political activity, the ruling elite is ensuring that the

country will produce semi-educated graduates who are unfamiliar with the political culture of democracy and pluralism. What better way to perpetuate oneself in power!

Arrested Brigadier's Treatment in U.S. Viewed

92AS1303C Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
9 Jul 92 p 1

[News Report: "U.S. Court Declares Brigadier Inam Guilty"]

[Text] Philadelphia (APP)—A jury in Philadelphia, a city in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania, has declared Pakistani businessman Brigadier (Retd.) Inam-ul Haq guilty. He was accused of trying to send special quantities of steel known as Merazang Steel-350 to Pakistan for use in high-speed compressors and turbines. The fact is that it was to be used in Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear plant.

The jury made this decision after five days of deliberation. It was headed by James Gills of the Eastern District Court. When the jury announced its decision, Brig. Inam-ul Haq was present in the court. His wife and some of his relatives were also present. The jury declaring him guilty said that his punishment would be announced at a 22 September hearing. Until then, he will be placed under house arrest. William Kunstler, Brig. Inam-ul Haq's lawyer, told the jury that his crime did not deserve its punishment, because it was done out of patriotism, should not be viewed as a crime, and did not break any laws. He said it should be called a crime of patriotism. It should be remembered that Brig. Inam-ul Haq tried to send 30,000 tons of a special type of steel through Dalal Arshid Parvez, a Pakistani settled in Canada. He was later arrested in Germany and sent to the United States of America. At the time, he was on a business trip to Germany. The case against Arshid Parvez ran for 32 months, and he was later freed.